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ARTICLES
Constitutional Litigation in Federal and
State Courts: An Empirical Analysis
of Judicial Parity
By
MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE*
JAMES L. WALKER**
Introduction
Since the ratification of the Constitution nearly two centuries ago,
cases arising under the Constitution or the laws of the United States
have been adjudicated in the parallel systems of federal courts and the
courts of each state. Despite this venerable tradition, the litigation of
federal cases in state courts has remained a source of an equally long-
lived and widespread controversy in judicial opinions and the aca-
demic literature.' The contemporary focus of this controversy is based,
in particular, on arguments suggesting that state courts are institution-
ally incompetent to properly adjudicate federal rights, or are even hos-
* Clerk to Judge Walter H. Rice, United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Ohio. B.A., 1978, Wright State University; J.D., 1981, Northwestern University.
Member, Ohio Bar.
** Associate Professor and Chairman, Department of Political Science and Urban Af-
fairs, Wright State University. B.A., 1963, Santa Clara; M.A., 1964, Ph.D., 1974, University
of California at Berkeley. The authors wish to thank Professor John P. Heinz of Northwest-
ern University School of Law and Professor William K. Muir, Jr., of the University of Cali-
fornia at Berkeley for their helpful criticisms on an earlier draft of this article. Earlier
versions of this article were also presented at the 1982 Annual Meetings of the Midwest
Political Science Association and the American Political Science Association.
I. The number of applicable judicial opinions and related academic commentaries has
grown spectacularly in the last decade. For useful overviews of both case law and academic
opinions, see P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S
THE FEDERAL CouRTs AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM chs. VII-VIII (2d ed. 1973 & Supp. 1981)
[hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER]; M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS
IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER (1980); State Courts and Federalism in the 1980"s,
22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 599 (1981). The controversy has even moved Congress to propose
the creation of a commission to study the jurisdiction of federal and state courts. See, e.g., S.
675, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S. 3123, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
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tile to the vindication of such rights.2
The purpose of this article is to explore the empirical component
of this debate, that is, the presumed incompetency or hostility of state
courts toward the adjudication of federal rights.3 We first review the
establishment of the lower federal courts and state courts. We then
turn toward the strands of the contemporary debate: the equitable doc-
trine of limiting the power of federal courts to enjoin or otherwise in-
terfere with state court proceedings, the limitations upon federal courts
in reviewing the validity of convictions obtained in state courts, and the
ability of Congress to curtail the jurisdiction of lower federal courts.4
Having established the outline of the debate, we examine evidence
from the social sciences and from contemporary notions of the proper
role of federalism which is said to justify distrust of state courts. Find-
ing such evidence to be wanting,5 we present our own study of the ad-
judication of certain federal rights in federal and state courts in the past
decade. Our study indicates that state courts are no more "hostile" to
the vindication of federal rights than are their federal counterparts,
6
2. The seminal article advancing this argument is by Professor Neubome. Neuborne,
The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977).
3. We are thus concerned with the adjudication of federal constitutional rights (or
rights arising under federal statutes), not of state constitutional rights. In an era of per-
ceived contraction of federal rights by the Burger Court, there has been a revived interest in
the adjudication of personal liberties derived from state constitutions. See, e.g., Hancock,
State Court Activism and Searches Incident to Arrest, 68 VA. L. REv. 1085 (1982); Howard,
State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court. 62 VA. L. REV. 873
(1976); Walinski & Tucker, Expectations ofPrivacy: Fourth Amendment Legitimacy Through
State Law, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1981); Project Report, To ward an Activist Rolefor
State Bills of Rights, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 271 (1973); Developments in the Law-The
Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324 (1982); Note, The New
Federalisn" Toward a Princplled Interpretation of the State Constitution, 29 STAN. L. REv.
297 (1977); Note, Private Abridgment ofSpeech and the State Constitutions, 90 YALE U. 165
(1980). Indeed, some writers have actively encouraged state courts to circumvent restrictive
federal court decisions by expanding interpretations of state constitutional provisions. See,
e.g., Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv.
489 (1977). See generally Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-wav From a Reactionary
Approach, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1981).
4. See infra Part IB. We have chosen these particular doctrines to illustrate the con-
temporary debate over the comparative competence of federal and state courts to adjudicate
federal rights, which we will hereinafter refer to as "parity." Other aspects of federal and
state jurisdiction, such as the abstention doctrine or the scope of the Eleventh Amendment,
can also implicate and be discussed in the framework of parity-the former because it
postpones, the latter because it eliminates entirely, the adjudication of federal constitutional
issues in federal courts. See M. REDISH, supra note 1, ch. IX; Wolcher, Sovereign Immunity
and the Supremacy Clause: Damages Against States in Their Own Courtsfor Constitutional
Violations, 69 CALiF. L. REV. 189, 198-200 (1981).
5. See infra Part IIA.
6. See infra Part HB.
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and we conclude that the opportunity for review by state appellate
courts and the United States Supreme Court significantly mitigates
concern over the institutional competence of state trial courts.7 In
short, we argue that, within specified limits, "parity" does exist between
federal and state courts.
I. Federal and State Court Parity: Antecedents and
Contemporary Practice
A. The Madisonian Compromise and Beyond
As noted above, the debate over the existence of parity springs
from the initial establishment of the lower federal courts by the Consti-
tution. Article III of the Constitution provides that there "shall" be one
Supreme Court, but the Congress "may" establish lower federal
courts.8 Providing Congress with the discretion to create the latter
courts was the culmination of a debate at the Constitutional Conven-
tion. Some of the Framers argued for the mandatory creation of fed-
eral tribunals inferior to the United States Supreme Court, to properly
manage large caseloads and to serve as an enforcement arm for the
President and the Congress.9 The opponents contended that such
courts would be unnecessary and duplicative, since state courts were
available to adjudicate federal cases. James Madison and James Wil-
son ultimately offered a plan to resolve the conflict, which has taken the
name of the first of its authors. The Madisonian Compromise gave
Congress the option to create or not to create lower federal courts; this
Compromise was adopted at the convention as a part of Article III. °
The significance of the Compromise lies not so much in the discre-
tion to create (since inferior federal courts were, in fact, established by
the First Judiciary Act of 1789),11 as in the contemplation that federal
cases would be litigated in state courts. Indeed, not until 1875 did Con-
gress expand the jurisdiction of the federal district courts to include
7. See infra Part III.
8. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, provides in part that "[tihe judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish."
9. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 11; Redish & Woods, CongressionalPower
to Control the Jurisdiction ofLower Federal Courts: 4 Critical Review and a New Synthesis,
124 U. PA. L. Rlv. 45, 52-53 (1975).
10. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 11-12; Redish & Woods, supra note 9, at
54.
11. See I Stat. 73 (1789). See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 32-35.
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cases involving general federal questions.' 2 Both civil and criminal
federal cases have been adjudicated in state courts, 13 and concurrent
jurisdiction has been described as a "common phenomenon" by the
Supreme Court.'4 Congress unquestionably has the power to exclude
the state courts from adjudicating federal cases, though in practice such
exclusion has been the exception, not the rule.15 In adjudicating these
cases, state courts are bound by the Supremacy Clause 16 to apply rele-
vant federal law, and thus are endowed with the same power and re-
sponsibility to enforce federal constitutional principles as are their
federal counterparts."
Bound by federal law and under the review of state appellate
courts and, ultimately, the United States Supreme Court, state courts
seem to be, in the abstract, appropriate forums for the adjudication of
federal rights. This argument, however, has come under attack as fail-
ing to recognize the lack of parity-that state courts are not institution-
ally comparable to federal courts in vindicating federal rights. This
conclusion considerably undermines the support for any doctrine that
will deprive a plaintiff of a federal forum in which to vindicate federal
rights. But before turning toward consideration of the empirical sup-
port for this conclusion, we will review categories of jurisdictional doc-
trine that highlight the current debate over parity.
B. Parity and the Contemporary Debate
. Younger v. Harris
The prosecution of criminal actions in a state court can potentially
raise a variety of federal constitutional questions, including the consti-
12. See Judiciary Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1976 & Supp. V 1981)). The 1875 Act expanded the statutory grant of jurisdiction almost to
the full extent of authorization found in U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. See HART & WECHS-
LER, supra note 1, at 39.
13. See, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 390-93 (1947); Warren, Federal CriminalLaws
and the State Courts, 38 HARV. L. REv. 545 (1925). See also, e.g., Note, State Enforcement of
Federally Created Rights, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1551 (1960).
14. See, e.g., Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 502-08 (1962). See also,
e.g., Hathom v. Lovorn, 102 S. Ct. 2421, 2428 (1982); Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
453 U.S. 473,477-78 (1981). See generally Redish & Muench,A djudicatlon of Federal Causes
ofAction in State Court, 75 MICH. L. REv. 311 (1976).
15. See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 418-19; Redish & Muench, supra
note 14, at 313-14.
16. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
17. See Hathorn v. Lovorn, 102 S. Ct. 2421, 2430 (1982); Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct.
2211, 2220 (1982); FERC v. Mississippi, 102 S. Ct. 2126,2139 n.28 (1982); Gulf Offshore Co.
v. Mobile Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 n.4 (1981); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389 (1947);
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 434-38.
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tutionality of the state statute under which the prosecution is brought.
Traditionally, a defendant in such an action must raise these issues in
the state court system. However, a state defendant can also seek an
equitable remedy in federal court, such as enjoining the state proceed-
ing if he can show irreparable harm as a result of the prosecution. Fed-
eral courts were long reluctant to flesh out this narrow federal
remedy,'" but the doctrine seemingly flourished with the decision in
Dombrowski v. Pfister.19 The plaintiffs in Dombrowski sought to enjoin
the enforcement of state laws alleged restrictive of their First Amend-
ment rights. After restating the traditional reluctance of federal courts
to exercise their equitable powers against state courts,2 ° the majority
nevertheless held that an injunction must issue since protracted litiga-
tion in state court would have a chilling effect on the exercise of First
Amendment rights.2 1 Justice Harlan in dissent argued that the major-
ity's approach was premised on the notion that state courts will not
vindicate constitutional rights as effectively as federal courts22-or, in
other words, that parity was being ignored.
Harlan's dissent in Dombrowski effectively became the majority
position six years later in the celebrated decision of Younger v. Harris
23
and its companion cases.24 Younger held that, in the absence of ex-
18. See, e.g., Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943). See generally HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 1009-13; Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federal-
irm, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1133, 1278-81 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Developments]. The doc-
trine of equitable restraint is to be distinguished from the strictures of the Anti-Injunction
Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976), which prohibits federal courts from enjoining state court
proceedings, unless the injunction falls under three narrow exceptions. In Mitchum v. Fos-
ter, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), the Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976)--under which
most civil rights actions are brought-fell under the "expressly authorized by Act of Con-
gress" exception found in the anti-injunction statute. 407 U.S. at 243 (construing 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283 (1976)). Nevertheless, Mitchum held that the barriers of equitable restraint must still
be surmounted by a plaintiff utilizing § 1983. Id For a further discussion of Mitchum, see
infra note 58 and sources cited in notes 58-59.
19. 380 U.S. 479 (1965). For an article surveying lower courts after Dombrowskli, and
concluding that the decision led to extremely few injunctions being issued in cases claiming
a chilling effect on First Amendment rights, see Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against
State Court Proceedings: The Sign#Fcance of Dombrowski, 48 TEx. L. REv. 535, 606 (1970).
20. 380 U.S. at 484-85. Recently, Professor Laycock argued that, in light of earlier
Supreme Court and lower court decisions, Dombrowski in fact stated the rule of equitable
restraint more broadly than was justified. See Laycock, FederalInteiference with State Pros-
ecutions: The Cases Dombrowski Forgot, 46 U. CHi. L. REv. 636 (1979). For a response to
Laycock, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 286 (Supp. 1981).
21. 380 U.S. at 486-89.
22. Id at 498 (Harlan, J., joined by Clark, J., dissenting).
23. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
24. Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Perez
v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell,
401 U.S. 66 (1971).
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traordinary circumstances, a federal court could not enjoin a state
criminal proceeding.25 The majority opinion by Justice Hugo Black
relied on traditional principles of equity doctrine, the notion of federal-
state comity, and the values underpinning "Our Federalism.." 26
Younger's progeny have come to rely explicitly on the values of par-
ity, 27 and have expanded the concept of parity to preclude the use of
injunctive or declaratory relief by federal courts to interfere with
"quasi-criminal" state court proceedings, 8 civil contempt proceed-
ings,29 or civil litigation involving "important state interests."30 In the
past decade, judicially developed exceptions to Younger have been rel-
atively infrequent,31 and Younger has become the primary focus for the
critics of parity.32
2. Stone v. Powell
Although federal courts had possessed the power to issue writs of
habeas corpus on petitions by state prisoners since 1867,33 that power
usually was limited to considering only the validity of the jurisdiction
25. 401 U.S. at 53-54.
26. 401 U.S. at 43-44. For a sample of the enormous amount of literature on Younger
and its progeny, much of it highly critical of the decisions and the concepts of parity, see M.
REDISH, supra note 1, ch. XI; Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation,
22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 605 (1981); Field, The Uncertain Nature of Federal Jurisdiction, 22
WM. & MARY L. REv. 683 (1981); Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103 (1977); Laycock,
Federal lnteiference with State Prosecutions The Needfor Prospective Relief, 1977 Sup. CT.
REv. 193; Redish, The Doctrine of Younger v. Harris: Deference in Search of a Rationale, 63
CORNELL L. REv. 463 (1978); Rosenfeld, The Place of State Courts in the Era of Younger v.
Harris, 59 B.U.L. REv. 597 (1979); Wechsler, Federal Courts, State Criminal Law and the
First Amendment, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 740 (1974); Maroney & Braveman, "Averting the
Flood' Henry J Friendly, the Comity Doctrine, andthe Jurisdiction fthe Federal Courts (pt.
2), 31 SYRACUSE L. REv. 469 (1980). For a lengthier compilation of articles, see Maroney &
Braveman, supra, at 475 n.30.
27. In Younger, Justice Black described "comity" as the "proper respect for state func-
tions." 401 U.S. at 44. This preference for comity can be construed as shading into the
concept of parity--that is, avoiding "affront" to state courts by suggesting that they cannot
properly adjudicate federal rights. See Redish, supra note 26, at 482-84; Developments,
supra note 18, at 1284.
Nevertheless, only Younger's progeny were to explicate the concept of parity. See, e.g.,
Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 429-30 (1979); Hoffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 610-11 •
(1975).
28. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
29. See, e.g., Judice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
30. See, e.g., Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 102 S. Ct.
2515 (1982); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977).
31. But see Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460-63 (1974) (Younger deference does
not extend to only threatened state court prosecutions). See also Wooley v. Maynard, 430
U.S. 705 (1977); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973) (applied exceptions of Younger).
32. See supra sources cited in note 26.
33. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, 14 Stat. 385, (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976)).
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of a sentencing court.34 The scope of the writ was finally expanded in
the middle of the century by the landmark decision of Brown v. Allen, 35
where the Court held that a federal court could review the validity of a
state court conviction when it rested on a determination of a federal
constitutional claim.36 The writ was further expanded in Fay v. Noia,3 7
where habeas corpus relief was permitted despite the state prisoner's
failure to properly appeal his conviction in the state court system.
A few commentators, along with Justice Lewis Powell, expressed
disquietude over this expansion of relitigation of federal claims already
addressed in state courts. Their concern was based particularly on the
fact that the decisions of an entire state court hierarchy would thus be
subordinated to the opinion of a single federal district judge.38 These
reservations were adopted by the Court in the past decade as a ration-
ale for curtailing the expansion of the writ in the review of state court
convictions. The most significant expression of this trend came in
Stone v. Powell,39 where the Court held that Fourth Amendment
claims could be relitigated on habeas corpus only upon a showing that
the petitioner did not have a full and fair opportunity to have that
claim considered in the state court system." In the course of the opin-
ion, the Court expressly reiterated the concept of parity as providing
the basis for deference to state court decisionmaking.4 1 While the
34. Stimulating overviews of the history of the writ of habeas corpus and the expansion
of its use can be found in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,474-80 (1976); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391, 399-426 (1963); id at 450-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1,
ch. X, § 2; Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpusfor State Prisoners, 76
HARv. L. REv. 441 (1963).
35. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
36. Id at 457-65.
37. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). Fay, of course, has been severely undercut by the "cause" and
"prejudice" rule developed in Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982), and Wainright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72 (1977).
38. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 259-61 (1973) (Powell, J., con-
curring); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 1465-75; Bator, supra note 34, at 50; Friendly,
Is Innocence Irrelevant? CollateralAttack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CH. L. REv. 142
(1970).
Empirical evidence has supported these doubts to some extent, since habeas petitions
comprise a large percentage of the federal court caseload, HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1,
at 8 (Supp. 1981), while very few petitions are granted. Id at 422 (Supp. 1981) (citing P.H.
ROBINSON, AN EMPRmcAL STUDY OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW OF STATE COURT
JUDGMENTS (1979) (3.2% of petitions granted)).
39. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
40. Id at 482.
41. Id at 493 n.35. See also California v. Grace Brethren Church, 102 S. Ct. 2498, 2513
n.37 (1982). Stone, like Younger, came under heavy criticism in the academic literature.
See, e.g., Michael, The "New" Federalism and the Burger Court's Deference to the States in
Federal Habeas Proceedings, 64 IOWA L. REv. 233 (1979). For a more reserved appraisal,
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scope of Stone v. Powell is not without limits,4 2 the Court recently held
in Allen v. McCurry4 3 that the doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents a
federal court from entertaining a section 1983 suit to reconsider a
Fourth Amendment claim litigated in a state court suppression hear-
ing.44 Once again, the Court suggested that opposition to the holding
could only be premised on a failure to recognize parity.
45
3. Congressional Restriction of Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction
The existence or nonexistence of parity is also a contemporary
concern of the legislative branch. Once a relatively moribund topic,
the power of Congress to deprive federal district courts46 of jurisdiction
to hear certain classes of cases has recently received increased attention
in the academic literature and in the United States Congress. As we
have already noted, Article III of the Constitution grants Congress dis-
cretion to create federal tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court. It has
been assumed that such discretion includes the power to abolish such
federal tribunals, that is, to withdraw their jurisdiction completely.47 A
see Halpern, Federal Habeas Corpus and the Mapp Exclusionary Rule after Stone v. Powell,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1982); Cover & Aleinikoff, DialecticalFederalisnr Habeas Corpus and
the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977).
42. The Court later held that the Stone limitation was not applicable to a claim that a
state grand jury was selected in a racially discriminatory manner, Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S.
545, 560-61 (1979), or to a claim that evidence did not support a conviction beyond a reason-
able doubt, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321 (1979).
43. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
44. Id at 104-05.
45. Id. at 105. Accord Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 102 S. Ct. 1883, 1895-96
(1982); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519 (1982); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128-29 (1982).
46. We do not consider congressional power to restrict the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, which is considered to be far narrower than the power with regard to lower
federal courts. On that topic, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 360-65; Redish,
Congressional Power to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction under the Exceptions
Clause: An Internal and External Examination, 27 VILL. L. REv. 900 (1982); Sager, The
Supreme Court, 1980 Term--Forewor, Constitutional Limitations on Congress'Authority to
Regulate the Jurisdiction ofthe Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REv. 17, 30-33, 37-60 (1981);
Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Reflections on the Law dnd the
Logistics of Direct Review, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1043 (1977). Indeed, we assume that
parity can be justified by recognizing the ultimate opportunity for review of state court deci-
sions by the Supreme Court. See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478
n.4 (1981); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,493 n.35 (1976). See also infra text accompanying
note 163.
47. See, e.g., Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 400-01 (1973); Kline v. Burke
Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850). See also, eg.,
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858, 2867-68 n.15
(1982) (plurality opinion); Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100,
117 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 330-31, 359-60;
Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction; 4
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corollary of this power is the discretion to "abolish" jurisdiction selec-
tively by withdrawing jurisdiction over particular classes of cases. 48
Although buttressed by Supreme Court opinions, this seemingly
unfettered discretion has come under attack recently in the wake of a
renewed congressional interest in stripping federal courts of jurisdic-
tion over controversial "social issues"--such as abortion, school prayer,
and busing.49 The debate again turns largely on arguments over the
validity of parity. If certain cases are deprived of a federal forum, they
could presumably be litigated in state courts with ultimate review pos-
sible by the Supreme Court. Some scholars, however, argue that the
power to curtail federal court jurisdiction can no longer be derived
from Article III in light of "changing circumstances," since such cur-
tailment would destroy the federal court's "modem" role of providing
uniform adjudication of federal rights.5 0 To leave such rights to be
adjudicated in state courts, they contend, not only leaves their vindica-
Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 143 (1982); Sager, supra note 46, at 33-36;
Redish & Woods, supra note 9, at 46-47.
48. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 12; Redish & Woods, supra note 9, at 47.
But see Sager, supra note 46, at 68-74 (selectively restricting federal court jurisdiction to
entertain certain rights impermissably burdens the exercise of those rights).
49. For examples of such recent congressional proposals to limit the jurisdiction of
lower federal courts, see S. 583, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (abortion); H.R. 2347, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (school prayer); S. 1005, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (busing). For a
lengthier compilation of bills, see Sager, supra note 46, at 18 n.3, 74 n.174. See also Cm-
ZENS COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, "THERE IS NO LIBERTY. . ." A REPORT ON CONGRES-
SIONAL EFFORTS TO CURB THE FEDERAL COURTS AND TO UNDERMINE THE BROWN
DECISION (Oct. 1982). None of these bills passed the 97th Congress.
Despite the recent outcry, congressional attempts (some successful) to restrict federal
court jurisdiction have a long history and are not as unusual as some contemporary critics
suggest. See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 360-65; Nagel; Court-Curbing
Periods in American History, 18 VAND. L. REV. 925 (1965); Handberg & Hill, Court Curbing,
Court Reversals, and Judicial Review: The Supreme Court versus Congress, 14 LAW & Soc'Y
REV. 309 (1980).
50. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Juris-
diction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974); Kaufman, Congress v. The Court, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20,
1981, § 6 (Magazine), at 44.
This theory seems to be a revival of Justice Story's argument that Article III mandates
the creation of lower federal courts, and the complete vesting of federal jurisdiction therein
once they are created. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 305 (1816)
(Story, J.). See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 313. More recently, Professor
Goebel has reached a similar conclusion based on his review of the deliberation at the Con-
stitutional Convention. See I J. GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 240-46 (1971). Both posi-
tions are unpersuasive: Story's view has been explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court, see,
e.g., Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 401 n.9 (1973), while Goebel's thesis does
violence to the Madisonian Compromise and the language of Article III itself. See, e.g.,
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 12 n.46; Redish & Woods, supra note 9, at 59-6 1. Thus,
the "modem role" or "changing circumstances" theory, prohibiting Congress from restrict-
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tion to the whim of indifferent or hostile state judges, but fails to recog-
nize that such decisions could not be effectively reviewed by an already
overburdened Supreme Court.5' While these views may possibly be
defended as good policy, we think that they cannot provide a constitu-
tional basis to restrict congressional power, since most scholars have
persuasively argued that they contradict the intent of the Madisonian
Compromise and find no support in the language of Article 111.52
ing lower federal court jurisdiction, is without precedential or historical support. See also,
e.g., Sager, supra note 46, at 35-36.
51. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 50, at 510-11; Kaufman, supra note 50, at 98, 100,
102; TaylorAttacks on Federal Courts Could Shift Historic Roles, N.Y. Times, May 16, 1982,
at 1, cols. 2-3. See also, e.g., Meserve, Limiting Jurisdiction and Remedies of Federal Courts,
68 A.B.A. J. 159, 161 (1982).
These reasons are also advanced by critics of current congressional bills, see, e.g., supra
note 49, restricting federal court jurisdiction over cases involving controversial issues. See,
e.g., 127 CONG. REc. S6780 (daily ed. June 23, 1981) (farming out important issues on indi-
vidual rights to state courts would lead to "an ice age in constitutional law.") (statement of
Prof. Tribe). See, e.g., also Sager, supra note 46, at 73-74; Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymander-
ing: Zoning Disfavored Rights Out of the Federal Courts, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 129
(1981).
52. As Professor Redish points out, the history or language of Article III is not suscepti-
ble to a flexible interpretation as envisioned by the proponents of the "changing circum-
stances" theory. See Redish & Woods, supra note 9, at 69-75. Moreover, there is little
principled basis to distinguish congressional restrictions forbidden by the theory as com-
pared to "neutral, housekeeping" restrictions permitted by the theory, such as the (now abol-
ished) $10,000 jurisdictional requirement, 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976), in federal question
cases. Redish & Woods, supra note 9, at 69-75.
Professor Redish, however, would place his own limits on Congress' Article III power
by relying on Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871). In Tarble's Case the Supreme
Court overturned a writ of habeas corpus issuing from a Wisconsin state court which or-
dered the release of a United States Army soldier. The Tarble's Case opinion used particu-
larly sweeping language in restricting the power of state courts to control federal officers. Id
at 407-09. As a critic of parity, Redish argues that the Tarble's Case language and result are
fully justified given the primacy of federal courts in adjudicating federal rights. Redish &
Woods, supra note 9, at 94-101. Based on Tarble's Case, Redish would forbid congressional
restrictions of federal court jurisdiction which would permit only state courts to adjudicate
the constitutionality of federal schemes, if the remedy in such cases would require enjoining
or otherwise interfering with the activities of federal officers. Iae at 102. Nevertheless, Con-
gress could explicitly ordain that state courts can directly control federal officers. Id at 107.
See also Redish, supra note 47, at 158-60.
While Tarble's Case is still cited as good law, see, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228,
245 n.23 (1979), it has come under severe criticism as simply being incompatible with the
concept of parity. See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 357 n.48, 427-30; Bator,
supra note 26, at 632 n.64. Even the best-known critic of parity has called for a "rethinking"
of Tarble's Case, since it would limit the reviewing function of state courts once they do
adjudicate federal causes of action. See Neuborne, Toward Procedural Parity in Constitu-
tional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 725, 766 n.172 (1981). See also Chisum, Book
Review, 33 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1173-74 (1981). Cf. Sager, supra note 46, at 80-84 (even if
one concludes that Tarble's Case was wrongly decided, state judges are still bound to respect
and apply federal law under the Supremacy Clause).
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The debate over parity, springing from the genesis of federal
courts, continues to range today over a spectrum of jurisdictional is-
sues. Scholars continue to dispute the proper allocation of litigation
between state and federal courts. Some believe the debate is at an "im-
passe," since empirical verification of the existence of parity is thought
to be virtually impossible.53 We respectfully disagree. While recogniz-
ing the limitations of any statistical inquiry, we think that the existence
of parity is subject to affirmance or denial in light of the current deci-
sions of state and federal courts. Indeed, critics of parity have them-
selves relied, to a limited extent, on empirical evidence which, they
claim, casts doubt on the existence of parity.54 It is to a review of such
evidence, and to our own inquiry, which we now turn.
H. Empirical Comparisons of Federal and State Courts
A. The Myth of Parity
Skeptics of parity typically settle on two rationales to suggest a
litigant's preference for a federal forum. First, they argue that histori-
cal considerations-notably, the outcome of the Civil War and the pas-
sage of the constitutional amendments during the Reconstruction
Era-have elevated the federal government in general, and federal
courts in particular, to a place of prominence over their state counter-
parts. In addition, they assert that contemporary institutional differ-
ences between federal and state courts justify preference for the former
over the latter.
The first rationale provides a starting point for those who question
the existence of parity. The debate over parity, as they see it, was
largely settled with the defeat of the secessionist states in the Civil
War.55 Centralized government and the federal judicial power were
enhanced by the passage of the Reconstruction constitutional amend-
ments, 56 by the broadening of the jurisdiction of the federal courts in
53. See M. REDISH, supra note I, at 3; Neuborne, supra note 52, at 726.
54. See, e.g., Neuborne, supra note 2, at 1116-17 n.46.
55. See M. RDISH, supra note 1, at 2; Maroney & Braveman, supra note 26, at 505-08;
Redish & Woods, supra note 9, at 97-101. See also Neuborne, supra note 2, at 1114-15.
We also note that the Justices of the Supreme Court who have criticized parity have
also relied mainly on historical considerations, and have eschewed any reference to empiri-
cal data discussed later in this article. See, e.g., Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v.
McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 124 n.11 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 526 (1976) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting); Steffel v. Thompson, 415
U.S. 452, 463-64 (1974) (Brennan, J.).
56. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (ratified 1865); amend. XIV (ratified 1868); amend. XV
(ratified 1870).
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1875,17 and by the passage of 42 U.S.C. section 1983 to enforce civil
rights.5" These developments were hastened, to a large extent, by the
perceived hostility of state courts to the enforcement of federal rights
created by the amendments.5 9 They say, quite frankly, that all of these
developments are proof that there was no parity between state and fed-
eral courts, and that there was systematic hostility to the vindication of
federally created rights. Moreover, the asserted dismal performance of
state courts (particularly in the South) in the modem civil rights era
lends modem validity to this historical construct."0
One cannot quarrel, of course, with the supremacy of the national
government, nor with the hostility of some courts to the enforcement of
federal rights, after the Civil War. Doubters of parity, however, can
marshall no evidence to suggest that state courts continued to be sys-
tematically hostile to federal rights after Reconstruction.6" To the ex-
tent that the hostility was revived in some state courts during the 1950's
57. See supra note 12.
58. In Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), the Supreme Court canvassed the legis-
lative history of § 1983 and concluded that the Reconstruction legislation, including § 1983,
was enacted in large part due to the antipathy of state officials and state courts towards
federal rights. Id at 242-43. Section 1983 was, in short, "a product of the vast transforma-
tion from the concepts of federalism that had prevailed in the late 18th century.. . ." Id at
242. See Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 102 S. Ct. 2557, 2562-63 (1982). See also Whit-
man, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REv. 5, 23-24 (1980).
59. See Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 102 S. Ct. 2557, 2562-63 (1982). See also
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972); H. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE
IMPACT OF THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION ON THE CONSTITUTION (1973); Warren,
Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARV. L. REV. 345 (1930); Redish & Woods, supra
note 9, at 97-99.
60. A few state judges in the 1950's and 1960's enjoined the enforcement of federal civil
rights laws; the injunctions were overturned by federal courts based on, inter alia, the au-
thority of Tarble's Case. See, e.g., Alabama ex rel Gallion v. Rogers, 187 F. Supp. 848
(M.D. Ala. 1960), ajf'dper cur/am, 285 F.2d 430 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 913 (1961).
See generaly Redish & Woods, supra note 9, at 89-90. In addition, Southern state courts in
that period were perceived as being generally hostile to civil rights. See Meltsner, Southern
Appellate Courts: .4 Dead End, in SOUTHERN JUSTICE 136 (L. Friedman ed. 1965). But see
infra note 62.
For a more recent example, compare the ultimately unsuccessful actions of a state judge
in Louisiana who attempted to interfere with the busing remedy decreed by a federal judge
in a school desegregation case. See Marcus, The Louisiana Judicial Slugfest, Nat'l L.J., Jan.
19, 1981, at 1, cols. 1-3.
61. We know of no effort to systemically survey state court opinions after the Recon-
struction Era to determine their attitudes toward civil rights, or any other federal right. This
paucity of evidence has continued into modern times. Cf infra note 96 (discussing pub-
lished data on state supreme courts from 1870 until the present). See Hurst, The Function of
Courts in the United States, 1950-80, 15 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 401 (1981). Interestingly, two
writers have recently argued that, in the pre-World War I era, state courts exhibited a sur-
prisingly expansive attitude toward the interpretation of the rights of freedom of the press
and of speech under the First Amendment. See Anderson, The Formative Era in First
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and 1960'S,62 it was an unfortunate aberration not reflected on a nation-
wide basis today.63 In short, it can be argued that whatever the histori-
cal scorecard of state courts in enforcing federal rights, such a record
has only a tangential relevance to the modern debate over parity.64
While the origin of parity has its roots in history, we think the contin-
ued validity of parity should not forever be governed by events of over
a century ago.
The second rationale-alleged institutional incompetence-is also
lacking in significant force. Although most critics of parity have been
content to rely on rather abstract, conclusory assertions as to historical
changes in federalism, they have asserted some empirical evidence con-
cerning the comparative expertise of federal and state courts. The pri-
mary source of this evidence has been the much-cited article by
Professor Burt Neuborne, 65 which, after an extensive review of social
science data, concludes that federal courts are institutionally more
competent than state courts to enforce federal rights. Professor
Neuborne deserves much credit, we think, in grounding his criticism of
parity in evidence derived from the social sciences. After reviewing his
arguments, however, we suggest that they are ultimately inconclusive
and do not provide a compelling basis to discard parity.
In his article, Neuborne advanced three reasons supporting a pref-
erence for federal courts over state courts. First, federal courts will
have a higher level of technical competence in dealing with complex
A4mendment Theory, 1870-1915, 24 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 56 (1980); Rabban, The First Amend-
ment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE. L.J 514, 557-58 (1981).
62. See supra note 60. While the hostility of many state government officials in the
South towards civil rights in that period hardly requires documentation, the hostility of state
courts is more problematic. Indeed, one study of all race relation cases in Southern state
supreme courts between 1954 and 1963 indicated that 33% of all dispositions were favorable
to the black parties. See Vines, Southern State Supreme Courts and Race Relations, 18 W.
POL. Q. 5 (1965). This figure is strikingly similar to the results of our own study. See infra
text accompanying notes 122-38. The Vines study concluded that the record of Southern
judges "is more favorable to Negro claimants than in any other part of the state political
system." Vines, supra, at 18.
63. See Neuborne, supra note 2, at 1119. In particular, Professor Neuborne points out
that the "widespread breakdown of Southern justice which motivated enactment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, and similar breakdowns during the height of the civil rights movement
which provoked calls for significant expansions of federal jurisdiction, do not exist today."
Id at 1119 n.55 (citations omitted). For a favorable modern assessment of one of the more
notorious of the Southern supreme courts, see M. Porter & G. Tarr, Judicial Federalism and
the Alabama Supreme Court (Sept. 1982) (paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the
Am. PoL Sci. Ass'n, Denver, Colo.).
64. See, e.g., Block, Book Review, 1981 AM. B. FouND. REsEARCH J. 571, 572. Even
critics of parity acknowledge the limited utility of the historical evidence. See, e.g., M. RED-
ISH, supra note 1, at 274 n.100.
65. Neuborne, supra note 2.
226 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 10:213
legal issues.6 6 Second, the "psychological set" of federal judges insures
their greater receptivity to enforcing the interpretations of federal rights
outlined by the Supreme Court and other federal courts.67 Finally, the
federal judiciary's insulation from majoritarian pressures suggests that
federal judges will be more likely to reach decisions that may require
challenging the power of local interest groups. 68 These three factors,
Neuborne concludes, make the notion of parity, at least on a nation-
wide basis, a dangerous "myth."
In arguing the existence of "technical competence" of federal-as
opposed to state-judges, Neuborne focuses on the individual members
of the bench. He argues that a higher level of quality will be reflected
in the federal judiciary, since the requirement of Senate approval of
federal judicial appointments establishes a floor of competence higher
than that in the states. In addition, the prospect of high compensation
leads a greater number of qualified individuals to seek federal, rather
than state, judicial positions. In contrast, the selection processes for
state judges are based either on political patronage systems or on elec-
tions. The disparity is exacerbated, Neuborne contends, by the neces-
sity of comparing federal district judges with state trial judges, rather
than with those on state appellate courts.69 Finally, the assistants to a
federal judge, particularly the law clerks, may tend to outstrip their
state counterparts in ability and dedication.70
These arguments, we think, are not compelling. At the outset, the
proper comparison is between federal judges and the entire state court
system, including appellate courts. Such a comparison considerably
ameliorates the asserted failings of state courts. 71 In any event, modem
state trial judges and courts are not functioning at the antediluvian
level suggested by Neuborne. Surveys of current state trial judges, for
example, indicate that increasingly they are paid more and are organ-
66. Id at 1121-24.
67. Id at 1124-27.
68. Id at 1127-28.
69. Id at 1116 n.45, 1118-19. Neuborne argues that three factors require the compari-
son between federal district courts and state trial courts. First, delay in reaching decisions at
the trial and appellate levels may deter individuals from litigating the denial of their consti-
tutional rights. Second, appellate court ability to review the findings of fact by lower courts
is limited. Third, appellate court judges may be subject to the same majoritarian pressures
as are their state counterparts. Id
70. Id at 1122-23.
71. See infra text Part II. Professors Bator and Fischer share our concern with the
failure to include state appellate courts in the equation. See Bator, supra note 26, at 630,
Fischer, Institutional Competency: Some Reections on JudicialActiism in the Realm of Fo-
rum Allocation Between State and Federal Courts, 34 U. MIAMI L. REv. 175, 182-84 (1980).
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ized on a more professional basis.72  An earlier study by Kenneth
Dolbeare characterized state trial judges as largely uncreative defend-
ers of the status quo.7 3 More recent scholarship depicts a quite differ-
ent image, suggesting that the qualities of state judges will vary from
state to state and city to city, depending on their organizational envi-
ronment, their ties to the local political system, and the judicial role in
which they see themselves.74 Moreover, the staff support for state trial
judges has been increasing so that many judges now have or share law
clerks, as do their federal colleagues. 75 Finally, the alleged disparity in
72. As to the salaries of state judges, see Rank Order of Judicial Salaries, Income, and
Population, 4 STATE CT. J. (No. 4) 27 (1980). On the improving caliber of state trial courts,
see J. RYAN, A. ASHMAN, B. SALES, & S. SHARE-DuBoW, AMERICAN TRIAL JUDGES: THEIR
WORK STYLES AND PERFORMANCE (1980) [hereinafter cited as AMERICAN TRIAL JUDGES];
Sheran & Isaacman, State Cases Belong in State Courts, 12 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1, 47-50, 60-
61 (1978). While systematically collected, much of this evidence, we admit, impacts only
indirectly on the competence of state judges to adjudicate federal rights. The same can be
said, however, of virtually all of the evidence, much of it impressionistic, marshalled by
Neuborne. See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 7 1, at 180 & n.16. Cf. Bumiller, Choice of Forum in
Diversity Cases: Analysis of a Survey and Implication for Reform, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 749
(1981) (survey of lawyers concerning necessity of diversity jurisdiction).
The increasing professionalism of state courts is indicated by the many state judicial
systems which have adopted, in whole or in part, the Federal Rules of Evidence and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE, T-1 to T-198 (Supp. 1982) (21 states have adopted various forms of the Federal
Rules of Evidence); Sheran & Isaacman, supra, at 49-50 & n. 240 (40 states have adopted
versions of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). In addition, Neuborne himself has argued
that federal, rather than state, "collateral rules" (such as those relating to attorney's fees,
defenses and immunities, remedies, burdens of proof, discovery, and the like) should be
required in § 1983 actions litigated in state courts. See Neuborne, supra note 52, at 747-48,
780-87. His proposal would further lessen the alleged deficiencies in state court procedures.
73. See K. DOLBEARE, TRIAL COURTS IN URBAN PoLITICS: STATE COURT POLICY IM-
PACT AND FUNCTIONS IN A LOCAL POLITICAL SYSTEM (1967). Neuborne cited Dolbeare's
highly caustic appraisal as "[t]he only serious study" of state trial benches. See Neuborne,
supra note 2, at 1116-17 n.46.
74. Neuborne is correct in pointing out that relatively little work has been done on the
performance of state trial judges, particularly on the civil side. See, e.g., Ryan, Measuring
Judicial Pelformance in Trial Courts: Conceptual, Empirical, and Political Problems, 10 POL-
ICY STuD. J. 734 (1982); Sarat, Judging in Trial Courts: An Exploratory Study, 39 J. POL.
368, 369-70 (1977). What work has been done, however, flatly contradicts many of
Dolbeare's broad conclusions. Moreover, Dolbeare's study was limited to New York judges
in the early 1960's, while later studies have analyzed other geographical locales. See Levin,
Urban Politics and Judicial Behavior, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 193 (1972); Galanter, Palen &
Thomas, The Crusading Judge: Judicial Activism in Trial Courts, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 699
(1979); J. Walker, Judges as Lawyers and Public Officials (1974) (Ph.D. Dissertation) (avail-
able in University of California at Berkeley Library).
75. See AMERICAN TRIAL JUDGES, supra note 72, 227-43. Law clerks for federal judges
are typically recent graduates of law school, serving for one- or two-year terms, while those
for state judges are sometimes "career" clerks and serve for considerably longer periods.
See, e.g., Oakley & Thompson, Law Clerks in Judges' Eyes: Tradition and Innovation in the
Use of Legal Staff by American Judges, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 1286 (1979) (study of California
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selection procedures is somewhat overdrawn. On the one hand, the se-
lection process forfederal judges has always been, and continues to be,
"political" in nature.7 6 On the other hand, many states now appoint,
rather than elect, judges, suggesting that selection based on patronage
by local machine politics is, at least, ameliorated to some extent by the
use of an ostensible merit selection." The proper perspective, we ac-
knowledge, is a comparative one: even if state trial judges have fewer
shortcomings than asserted by the critics of parity, the quality of fed-
eral judges (however measured) is clearly higher. However, the evi-
dence indicates that the disparity is not so great as to be able to discard
parity out of hand.
In contrast to the technical competence argument, the "psychologi-
cal set" thesis focuses on the receptivity of state judges to the directives
of the Supreme Court. Neubome suggests that a "series of psychologi-
cal and attitudinal characteristics" make federal judges more likely to
enforce federal institutional rights.7 8 The psychological characteristics,
judges). The former, some contend, will be more attuned to recent developments in federal
law than the latter, and will, in turn, serve as more valuable sources of information for
judges. Id at 1287-89.
76. Candidates for the federal bench are typically nominated by the senators from each
state, who usually choose along party lines. See, e.g., Glick, Federal Judges in the United
States: Party, Ideology, and Merit Nomination, 12 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 767, 781 n.27 (1979);
Sheran & Isaacman, supra note 72, at 11. The "merit selection" nominating commissions
established by President Carter led, in fact, to a selection of more federal judges from the
President's own party than had occurred under the five previous presidents. See, e.g., Glick,
supra, at 805-06. See also Goldman, Judicial Backgrounds, Recruitment. andthe Party Varia-
ble: The Case of the Johnson and Nixon Appointees to the United States District andAppeals
Courts, 1974 ARiz. ST. L.J. 211; Goldman, Characteristics of Eisenhower and Kennedy Ap-
pointees to the Lower Federal Courts, 18 W. POL. Q. 755 (1965). This procedure has led to
the occasional appointment of a judge to the federal bench who would even embarrass the
critics of parity. See, e.g., Note, On Trial- Judge Julius Hoffman, 10 SANTA CLARA LAW. 385
(1970); Caldwell, Harold Cox: Still Racist After All These Years, Am. Law., July, 1979, at 1.
77. The most recent statistics indicate that for judges of supreme courts, one-half of the
states hold elections, the governor appoints in 21 others, and the legislature appoints in the
remaining four, for judges of states which have appellate courts, 17 states hold elections,
with the governor appointing in 15 others; finally, for judges of trial courts, 33 states hold
elections, in 19 states the governor appoints, and in the remaining three the legislature ap-
points. See Berkson, Judicial Selection in the United States: .4 Special Report, 64 JUDIcA-
TURE 176, 178 (1980); Sheran & Isaacman, supra note 72, at 41 n.217. See generally Berreby,
The Bench Meets the Ballot, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 1, 1982, at 1, cols. 1-3.
In any event, studies of the characteristics of appointed and elected state judges indicate
that there is a surprising lack of difference between them. See, e.g., Canon, The Impact of
Formal Selection Processes on the Characteristics of Judges-Reconsidered, 6 LAW & Soc'y
REv. 579 (1972); Flango & Ducat, What Differences Does Method of Judicial Selection Makc:
Selection Procedures in State Courts of Last Resort, 5 JUST. Sys. J. 25, 30-34 (1979).
The significance of state election ofjudges is considered at greater length in notes 84-87
and accompanying text, infra.
78. See Neuborne, supra note 2, at 1124.
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he says, draw on the elite tradition of the federal judiciary, as well as
the enhanced bureaucratic receptivity of federal judges to the rulings of
the Supreme Court. Similarly, the attitudinal characteristics of state
judges make it more likely that they will share the socioeconomic val-
ues of the defenders of the status quo in constitutional cases, and be
more likely to rule accordingly.
Again, we cannot deny the institutional 6lan of the federal judges
or their increased familiarity with and receptivity to Supreme Court
pronouncements. There is little evidence, however, that state judges
have, deliberately or unknowingly, evaded the implementation of
Supreme Court decisions. Indeed, the evidence indicates, to the sur-
prise of researchers, that state supreme courts have, for the most part,
uniformly enforced United States Supreme Court mandates. 79 This
suggests that state judges have their own sense of the necessity to com-
ply with Supreme Court directives.80 Finally, the notion that judges
79. Two studies of the decisions of state supreme courts, for example, have found that
they have "generally enforced the requirements" of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966). See Gruhl, State Supreme Courts and the U.S. Supreme Court's Post-Miranda Rul-
ings, 72 J. ClM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 886, 911 (1981); Romans, The Role ofState Supreme
Courts in Judicial Policy Making: Escobedo, Miranda and the Use of Judicial Impact Anaol-
sis, 27 W. POL. Q. 38 (1969). See also Canon, Reactions of State Supreme Courts to a U.S.
Supreme Court Civil Liberties Decision, 8 LAW & Soc'y REv. 109 (1973); M. Porter & G.
Tarr, supra note 63. On the civil side, Professor Franklin, in his survey of federal and state
court decisions implementing the Supreme Court's libel decisions, found that New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and its progeny were enforced to such an extent in
state courts that virtually no plaintiffs recovered. See Franklin, Suing Mediafor Libel- .4
Litigation Study, 1981 AM. B. FoUND. RESEARCH J. 795; Franklin, Winners and Losers and
Why: .4 Study of De/amation Litigation, 1980 AM. B. FoUND. RESEARCH J. 455.
Another study found no significant differences between state and federal judges in their
disposition of reapportionment cases. See Beiser,.4 Comparative Analysis of State and Fed-
eral Judicial Behavior: The Reapportionment Cases, 62 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 788 (1968). Fi-
nally, one recent study found that prisoners' rights cases were handled more sympathetically
in federal appeals courts than in state supreme courts. See Haas, The "New Federalism" and
Prisoner's Rights: State Supreme Courts in Comparative Perspective, 34 W. POL. Q. 552
(1981). However, the Haas study was not as broad as ours, and even he acknowledged that
state courts have been as liberal as their federal counterparts on other criminal and civil
rights issues. Id at 569.
In arguing that "the impact of state hostility to Supreme Court mandates has been
noted," Neuborne cited Beatty, State Court Evasion of United States Supreme Court Man-
dates during the Last Decade of the Warren Court, 6 VAL. U.L. REv. 260 (1972). Neuborne,
supra note 2, at 1116 n.46. The Beatty study, in fact, found that in only 27% of cases re-
manded by the United States Supreme Court to state courts, did the party obtaining the
remand eventually lose. See Beatty, supra, at 262. Beatty concluded that, "at a time when
disunity, disobedience and defiance persist in many aspects of intergovernmental relations, it
is refreshing to find that most state courts of last resort have an admirable record of compli-
ance." Id at 284.
80. Compliance by state and federal courts with Supreme Court mandates can be ana-
lyzed under three hypotheses or models. The hierarchical model suggests that lower courts
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will invariably vote on the basis of their social backgrounds is vastly
overstated; the relevant studies are virtually unanimous in concluding
that there is a very weak correlation between background characteris-
tics and judicial voting behavior.8" The upshot, again, is to call into
doubt the "psychological set" indictment of parity.
2
The last argument Neuborne makes is that the lifetime tenure of
federal judges provides a barrier against local political pressures influ-
encing a decision. In contrast, the necessity of elections may force their
state brethren to heed the wishes of the future electorate. Such
majoritarian pressures can endanger the enforcement of institutional
rights protecting minorities.8 3
The superiority of a lifetime appointment in countering
majoritarian pressures is rightly praised. It does not follow, however,
simply implement Supreme Court directives automatically. See, e.g., Gruhl, supra note 79,
at 887. The bureaucratic model argues that due to institutional restraints, such as ineffi-
ciency and recalcitrance, see Murphy, Lower Court Checks on Supreme Court Power, 53 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 1017 (1959), or incomplete intercourt communication, see G. TARR, JUDI-
CIAL IMPACT AND STATE SUPREME COURTS (1977), lower courts implement directives in-
consistently. Finally, the interaction model argues that due to the very few cases actually
decided by the Supreme Court, lower courts are usually left to formulate policies in the vast
interstices of case law. See, e.g., Baum, Lower Court Response to Supreme Court Decisions:
Reconsidering a Negative Picture, 3 JUST. Sys. J. 208, 216 (1978); Gruhl, supra note 79, at
887. See generally S. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: SOME
PERSPECTIVES 187-203 (1970); Gruhl, Anticipatory Compliance with Supreme Court Rulings,
14 POLITY 294 (1981). Most researchers feel that the latter two models provide the best
explanations. See, e.g., Gruhl, supra note 79, at 911. If so, the measure of "evasion" is likely
to yield few insights on the validity of parity.
81. The initial studies exploring the relationship between background characteristics
and voting behavior suggested that the correlation was a relatively high one. See, e.g.,
Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions, 55 AM. POL SCI. REV. 843 (1961).
Later studies, however, have uniformly concluded that the correlation is low and that back-
ground variables provide little explanatory power on a consistent basis over many cases.
See, e.g., Adamany, The Party Variable in Judges' Voting: Conceptual Notes and a Case
Study, 63 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 57 (1969); Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States
Courts ofAppeals Revisited, 69 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 491 (1975); Tate, PersonalAttribute Mod-
els of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and
Economics Decisions, 1946-78,'75 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 355, 355 (1981). Cf. Grossman, Social
Backgrounds and Judicial Decision-Making, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1551, 1562-63 (1966) (social
background of judges is not only factor determining their voting behavior).
The correlation argument is, in any case, something of a double-edged sword, since
federal judges can be analyzed in the same manner. The results have been the same whether
federal or state judges have been studied. See, e.g., Walker, A Note Concerning Partisan
Influence on Trial-Judge Decision Making, 6 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 645 (1972).
82. See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 71, at 191-92. With laudable candor, Neuborne admits
"the inherent difficulty of proving the validity of these psychological factors," and that "in
many cases ... they may not operate." Neubome, supra note 2, at 1127 n.79.
83. See Neuborne, supra note 2, at 1124-27.
Winter 1983] CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION: ANALYZING PARITY 231
that elections of state judges, to the extent they are still held, 4 will
influence the subsequent decisions of elected judges. Recent scholar-
ship indicates a weak linkage, on a consistent basis, between environ-
mental variables, such as public opinion, and court functions. 5 More
importantly, elections of state supreme court judges are characterized
by low turnout and a lack of salient "issues" to be weighed by voters, as
compared to other electoral contests.8 6 While perhaps not complemen-
tary of the attentiveness of state electorates, this evidence suggests that
most state judges are unlikely to feel in danger of being "punished" for
decisions upholding constitutional rights.8
84. See supra note 77.
85. See, e.g., Gibson, Environmental Constraints on the Behavior of Judges: A Represen-
tational Model of Judicial Decision Making, 14 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 343 (1980). Gibson ar-
gues that initial role orientations account for differences in decisionmaking, rather than the
prospect of electoral sanctions. See id at 360-66. There are, of course, several instances in
which judges have seemed to change their behavior in response to expressions of public
opinion. Recent action by the California Supreme Court upholding the validity of the "Vic-
tim's Bill of Rights," Proposition 8, (Prim. Elec. June 8, 1982) (adding CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 28, repealing art. I, § 12, and amending both the Penal and Welfare & Institutions Codes)
is a case in point. See also P. STOLZ, JUDGING JUDGES: THE INVESTIGATION OF ROSE BIRD
AND THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT (1981). But not all of these instances are necessarily
undesirable or unhealthy. For a study of California trial judges suggesting that public opin-
ion exerts greater control on judicial behavior than suggested in this paragraph, see Kuklin-
ski & Stanga, Political Particifpation and Government Responsiveness: the Behavior of
California Superior Courts, 73 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 1090 (1979). Kuklinski and Stanga do
not suggest, nor does their data support, a contention that state judges sacrifice constitutional
principles. The point of their work is that the public can participate in ways other than
voting.
Furthermore, historically, pressures are by no means limited to state judges. It should
be remembered that U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Marshall masterfully avoided im-
peachment (and strengthened his Court) by sacrificing the patently legitimate appointment
of the unfortunate Mr. Marbury. See M. COHEN, THE FAITH OF A LIBERAL 178-80 (1945).
86. See, e.g., P. DunoIs, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE
QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 36-177 (1980) (study of all elections for state supreme court
justices in non-Southern states between 1948 and 1974). For studies reaching similar con-
clusions, see Jacob, Judicial Insulation-Elections, Direct Participation, and Public Attention
to the Courts in Wisconsin, 1966 WIs. L. REv. 801; Volcansek,An Exploration of the Judicial
Election Process, 34 W. POL. Q. 572 (1981); Adamany & Dubois, Electing State Judges, 1976
Wis. L. REv. 731.
87. The argument that judges are unresponsive to outside constituencies can, again, ap-
ply to both state and federal judges. For example, several studies found high correlation
between the sentencing patterns by federal judges of convicted draft resisters, and public
opinion of the Vietnam War. See, e.g., Cook, Public Opinion and Federal Judicial Policy, 21
AM. J. POL. SCi. 567 (1977); Kritzer, Federal Judges and Their Political Environments: The
Influence of Public Opinion, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 194 (1979).
More recently, several federal circuit courts of appeal have been accused of being un-
fairly partisan to certain litigants, leading to "forum-shopping" by lawyers. See MeGarity,
Multi-Party Forum Shopping for Appellate Review of Administration Action, 129 U. PA. L.
REV. 302, 307-12 & n.42 (1980). See also Federal Venue Statutes: Hearing on S. 739 and S.
1472 Before the Subcomna on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comnm of the
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Based on this review, we conclude that the institutional factors
Neuborne relied upon-only indirect indicators of parity in any case-
do not survive close scrutiny. The social science evidence supporting
the alleged institutional deficiencies of state court judges does not prove
that state judiciaries are ignoring federal constitutional rights. Thus, as
Neuborne and other scholars have admitted,8 8 there is no direct evi-
dence concerning the existence of parity. We now turn to our study,
which attempts to set forth a preliminary presentation of data bearing
on this issue.
B. Adjudication of First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights in
Federal and State Courts: A Contemporary Survey
In order to establish direct evidence for the existence of parity, we
undertook an empirical study of federal and state cases where federal
constitutional issues were raised. The purpose of the study was to dis-
cover if there were any discernible differences in the way these issues
were resolved in these two court systems. Similar treatment of issues
would constitute evidence of the existence of parity, while significant
and consistent differences in treatment would be support for the posi-
tion that parity is a "myth."8 9
For reasons stated above, we believed that the differences between
federal and state treatment of constitutional issues had been exagger-
ated by the critics of parity.90 Therefore, we formulated the following
operational definition: Parity exists if, holding all other factors con-
stant, a litigant is, on the average, equally successful in both the federal
and state court systems.
The reason for stating the problem in this fashion is to stress the
fact that we are interested in outcomes of cases. The heart of parity or
lack thereof is the treatment of the claim raised by the litigants. Con-
siderations like judicial salaries, elegance of surroundings, and pedi-
grees of law clerks, all pale into insignificance when measured against
Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); VENUE AT THE CROSSROADS (S. Schlesinger ed.
1982).
88. See, e.g., M. REDISH, supra note 1, at 3; Neuborne, supra note 2, at 1116 & n.46;
Maroney & Braveman, supra note 26, at 509 n.278.
Apparently, the only two comparative studies prior to our own are those by Beiser and
Haas. See supra note 79.
89. See Neuborne, supra note 2, at 1105. Theoretically, of course, there are other possi-
ble positions. One could explain differences in overall treatment of constitutional issues
based on criteria other than those mentioned by Professor Neuborne. However, we believe
there is strong intuitive force to the position we have taken.
90. See supra text Part II A.
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results. 91 If there is a systematic and consistent lack of sympathy for
federal constitutional claims in state courts, then parity is a myth.
There are literally hundreds of factors that can affect the outcome
of a court decision.92 There are also several causes suggested for the
lack of parity between state and federal forums.93 A research design
must account for these factors and concentrate on the most important
measure-the results of the claim. In social science research, it is sel-
dom possible to use true experimental design methods where all factors
can truly be held constant.94 Thus, for example, no one can really
know how the "same case" would be handled in both state and federal
courts. This problem is overcome by sampling a number of cases from
both federal and state systems in order to generalize about the relative
performances of those systems.
By sampling a large enough number of cases and by carefully
choosing the sample, a researcher is able to "average out" the substan-
tive differences among the cases.95 Thus, differences such as strength of
claim, talent of counsel, and so forth, can be, in effect, held constant,
and the effect of the forum in which the case is heard can then be
determined.
Before proceeding with a discussion of the results of the sampling
of cases, several points should be raised concerning the methodology
used. The use of published opinions for empirical judicial research is
neither new nor unique.96 As with all data sources, these opinions have
91. See, e.g., Neuborne, supra note 2, at 1122. The authors who cite these factors as-
sume that they are causes of differential results; however, the causal link is not established.
92. See infra text Part I.
93. See, e.g., Neuborne, supra note 2, at 1118-130.
94. For a discussion of the differences between experimental and nonexperimental de-
sign, see D. CAMPBELL & J. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS
FOR RESEARCH (1966).
95. The size of the sample is the major determinant of the confidence with which a
researcher can generalize to the larger "universe." See generaly H. BLALOCK, SOCIAL STA-
TISTICS 553-77 (rev. 2d ed. 1979). Basically, a larger number of cases helps to insure that the
sample more closely resembles that body of cases known as the "universe" under study.
With a small sample it takes only a few cases to distort the result. With a larger sample, the
odds against distortion are much higher.
96. There is an enormous body of literature in both law and the social sciences that uses
the published opinions of courts as its data base. One of the most sanguine views of the
utility of opinions for such research was that of the legendary Karl Llewellyn, set forth in
THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 514 (1960). For a recent caveat on the
unrestrained use of case opinion data, see Cartwright, Conclusion: Disputes and Reported
Cases, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 369 (1975). Traditionally, opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court
have been the major source of data for empirical doctrine. An example is the pioneering
work of C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS
AND VALUES, 1937-1942 (1948), and the work of Glendon Schubert, e.g., THE JUDICIAL
MIND: THE ATTRIBUTES AND IDEOLOGIES OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 1946-1963 (1965).
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strengths as well as weaknesses. One immediate question that arises
about the present study is the choice of courts to be studied. We chose
state appellate and supreme courts and federal district courts.97 A le-
gitimate question can be raised as to whether the data are compara-
ble.98 There are three reasons for choosing these courts to compare. By
A more recent and more relevant study in the massive inquiry into state supreme court
decisionmaking funded by NSF Grant No. GS-384-13. This has led to several articles, in-
cluding Kagan, Cartwright, Friedman & Wheeler, State Supreme Courts: Century of Style
and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Citation by SSC], and, by the
same authors, The Business of State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970, 30 STAN. L. REv. 121 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Business of SSC].
97. Actually, our sample includes five different "types" of courts: state intermediate
courts of appeals, state courts of last resort, a very few state trial courts, federal district
courts, and three-judge panels. The state trial courts are not statistically significant in the
sample and the instance of three-judge federal courts arises only in the early years of the
sample, before such panels were limited by Congress in 1976. See 17 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4235 (1978). For a study
using a sample from the Federal Supplement, see Walker, supra note 81.
98. Neuborne argues that the proper comparison is between trial-level courts in the two
systems, see supra note 69, but his arguments are not convincing. First, he seemingly argues
that delays will characterize the litigation process in state, but not federal, courts. This
broad assumption is unwarranted. Until recently, there have been virtually no statistics kept
on docket congestion and delay in state or federal courts. See, e.g., Rosewell v. La Salle
Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 518-19 n.23, 520 n.25 (1981). What little data has been kept at the
trial court level indicates that the median interval from the filing of a complaint to disposi-
tion in civil cases, in both systems, typically averages almost two years, with delay slightly
more pronounced in state courts. Id at 519-20. For similar results in five states, see Gross-
man, Kritzer, Bumiller & McDougal, Measuring the Pace of Civil Litigation in Federal and
State Trial Courts, 65 JUDICATURE 86, 102-03 (1981). See also Trotter & Cooper, State Trial
Court Delay: Efforts at Reform, 31 AM. U.L. REv. 213 (1982). Dispositions are usually
quicker for criminal cases, due to plea bargaining and the application of federal and state
speedy trial acts. See, e.g., Martin & Prescott, he Magnitude and Sources of Delay in Ten
State Appellate Courts, 6 JUST. Sys. J. 305 (1981); Nardulli, he Caseload Controversy and
the Study of Criminal Courts, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 89 (1979). In both areas, the
disparity between federal and state court delay is hardly of a quantum nature so as to call
into question the validity of parity. Second, while we admit that factual records will assume
importance in criminal and other cases raising constitutional questions, see, e.g., Raymond
Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429,447 & n.25 (1978); Arlington Heights v. Metropol-
itan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); see also J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvIEW 136-48 (1980) (importance of factfinding in revealing uncon-
stitutional motivations), the increasing use by state courts of the Federal Rules of Evidence
and of Civil Procedure, see supra note 72, suggests that important facts will not go unre-
viewed by state appellate courts. In a related vein, a recent empirical study of discovery
procedures found few disparities (relevant to our study) between procedures in state and
federal trial courts. See Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of its E4fectiveness, Its Princi-
pal Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 787, 804-35. Finally, it is
doubtful, as Neuborne argues, that "majoritarian pressures," to the extent that they exist on
a systemic basis at all, apply with equal vigor to state appellate judges as they apply to state
trial judges. We have already indicated that many appellate judges are appointed, not
elected, and that those who are elected rarely are forced to defend unpopular decisions
before the electorate. See supra notes 77, 84-87 and accompanying text.
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far the most important reason has to do with the nature of parity itself.
Parity refers to the equal ability of the state and federal court systems
to handle federal constitutional claims.99 The dynamics of state court
behavior are such that important federal constitutional claims will tend
to be appealed at a higher-than-average rate, whereas in the federal
system federal constitutional claims are likely to be fully litigated at an
earlier stage. In any case the critics of parity concede that a relevant
comparison between federal district courts and state appellate and
supreme courts can be made."°°
A second reason is that a study of opinions of state trial courts is
virtually impossible. Full written opinions (as opposed to short orders
or entries) are a rarity, and even the full opinions are rarely reported.
On the other hand, a significant portion of state appellate and supreme
court and federal trial court opinions make their way into print.101 Fi-
nally, the use of state appellate court opinions recognizes the role of
these courts as the supervisors of state court systems. 102 In the area of
99. We mean this both as we have defined parity, and as parity is relevant to the
Supreme Court cases that gave birth to this discussion. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465 (1976); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
The question before us is whether the constitutional claim can be fully and fairly liti-
gated in the state system as well as in the federal system. Neither we, nor the Supreme Court
Justices writing in these cases, have ever said there would be an exact parallel in the time
frame (or court level) for each claim litigated. Furthermore, the model of parity posed by its
critics neglects the actual decisionmaking processes of both federal and state courts. See
infra text Part III.
100. See Neuborne, supra note 2, at 1116 n.45. For support of the notion that important
federal issues will be appealed at a higher rate, see Rathjen, Lawyers and the Appellate
Choice: An Analysis of Factors Affecting the Decision to Appeal, 6 AM. POL. Q. 387 (1978);
Johnson, Lawyers' Choice: A Theoretical Appraisal of Litigation Investment Decisions, 15
LAW & Soc'y Rnv. 567 (1981).
101. West Publishing Company reports all federal district court opinions sent to it, virtu-
ally in the order received, in the Federal Supplement. It also publishes significant state court
opinions in its regional reporter series. There would be no uniform way of sampling state
trial court decisions. For a discussion of the problem of unpublished opinions in state appel-
late courts, see Marvell & Kuykendall, Appellate Courts-Facts and Figures, 4 STATE CT. J.
9 (Spring 1980), and in federal district courts, see Vestal, A Survey of Federal District Court
Opinions: West Publishing Company Reports, 20 Sw. L.J. 63 (1966). The consensus of these
and other authorities seems to be that "significant" opinions will be published. See also
Jacobstein, Some Relections on the Control of the Publication fAppellate Court Opinions, 27
STAN. L. REv. 791 (1975). In any case, all studies consulted relied entirely on published
opinions. For a recent study covering all unpublished opinions and orders in § 1983 actions
in one federal district court, see Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Em-
pirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. Rnv. 482, 524-26 (1982). Our study provides a partial re-
sponse to Eisenberg's suggestions that a similar survey be made of state courts. Id at 524 &
n.179.
102. See, e.g., Note, Courting Reversak The Supervisory Role of State Supreme Courts, 87
YALE L.L 1191 (1978). The author concludes that the state supreme court is the significant
supervisor of state trial courts through its power to reverse. While her discussions and data
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federal constitutional rights it is the appellate courts that must be relied
on to make the major interpretation of the validity of claims, especially
where the litigant has no initial choice of forum.10 3
Federal constitutional claims can involve a host of different issues.
For our sample we decided to focus on claims based on three particular
constitutional areas: the First Amendment, 1°4 the Fourth Amend-
ment,'0 5 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 1°6
First Amendment claims were chosen because they reflect con-
cerns that are fundamental to the political system and to federalism.
They encompass a wide variety of issues, both civil and criminal. We
feel that of all the areas of constitutional law, they are most likely to
expose hostility and parochialism on the part of one set of judges or
another."0 7 Moreover, it is most appropriate to this study that these
claims be included, because two key cases in the parity issue-Dorn-
browski v. Pfister10 8 and Younger v. Harris'0 9-both raised First
Amendment claims.
refer to supreme courts, we think there is nothing preventing the analysis from applying to
state appellate courts as well.
103. For the sake of analysis we may divide federal constitutional claims into two types:
those in which a litigant has a choice of forum and those in which he does not. We have no
firm figures on which is the more "popular" forum for cases when there is a choice. How-
ever, the conventional wisdom is that plaintiffs in federal constitutional cases, or at least
their counsel, ought to, and do, prefer the federal court. See, e.g., Neuborne, supra note 2, at
1115. It is to this conventional wisdom that we address this study.
104. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
105. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
106. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1, cl. 4.
Of course the application of Amendments I and IV to the states has come through a
series of Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, notably Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961). The equal protection requirement is applied to the federal government through
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as in Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954), Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), and Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S.
57, 62 n.3 (1981).
107. Indeed, many of the landmark First Amendment cases involve social "pariahs" of
one sort or another-members of what Mr. Justice Stone called "discrete and insular minor-
ities." See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
These people, whether for religious or political reasons, are most in need of First Amend-
ment protection. See generally Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 103 S. Ct.
416, 420 (1982); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3423-25, 3433-34
(1982); M. SHPIRo, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1966); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrruTIONAL LAW 576-77 (1978); Baker, Scope afthe First
Amendment Freedom ofSpeech, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 964 (1978).
108. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
109. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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Fourth Amendment claims have many of the same features as
First Amendment claims. They encompass a broad spectrum of issues
that are salient in the public mind."'0 They are therefore likely to be
good bellwethers of possible public pressure on a judge. Futhermore,
another key "parity case"-Stone v. Powell'"-raised a Fourth
Amendment claim.
Equal protection claims strike to the heart of the parity question
and indeed to the whole question of federalism. The Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted for the express purpose of establishing fed-
eral supervision over state treatment of freed slaves.112 It reflected be-
lief on the part of Congress that there would not be parity of treatment
between state governments and the federal government. 13 Therefore,
contemporary comparative treatment of equal protection claims by
state and federal courts is a particularly apt measure of the existence or
nonexistence of parity.
110. The Fourth Amendment, in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961), was used to
impose the "exclusionary rule" on the state governments. The rule requires the suppression
of evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution. Perhaps no other decision in the crim-
inal justice area has led to more popular dissatisfaction with the court. See, e.g., R. HARIS,
THE FEAR OF CRIME (1968); Sunderland, Liberals, Conservatives, andthe Exclusionary Rule,
71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343 (1980). Many academic commentators, of course, sup-
port the rule. A recent example is Mertens & Wasserstrom, The GoodFaith Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365 (1981).
In Illinois v. Gates, 51 U.S.L.W. 4709 (1983), the Supreme Court recently declined to decide
whether the exclusionary rule should be modified after ordering reargument on precisely
that issue.
111. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
112. See J. TENBROEK, THE ANTI-SLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
(1951); Tussman, & tenBroek, he Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341
(1949). See also R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); Dimond, Strict Construction and Judicial Review of Ra-
cial Discrimination Under the Equal Protection Clause: Meeting Raoul Berger on Interpretivist
Grounds, 80 MICH. L. REv. 462 (1982).
113. Whatever the historical posture of Congress on the issue of parity was, see supra
notes 58-59, there is evidence that it has changed over the years. To the extent that congres-
sional intent is relevant, it is not clear that Congress still continues to prefer a federal forum
in many constitutional cases. For differing perspectives on this question, see Patsy v. Florida
Bd. of Regents, 102 S. Ct. 2557 (1982); Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 102 S. Ct. 1883
(1982); Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement ofFederal Law, 49 U. CHI. L.
REV. 394,410 n.59 (1982). This proposition may be tested very soon when Congress is asked
to act on proposals by the Attorney General to alter the forum allocation formula signifi-
cantly. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME: FINAL REPORT 42
(1981). See also Bator, supra note 34, at 441. A recent piece of legislation designed to limit
federal involvement in state criminal procedures is S. 2903, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. tit. III
(1982). See also Smith, Federal Habeas Corpus-A Need for Reform, 73 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1036 (1982).
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Obviously, many important federal constitutional claims are not
included. Noteworthy are the entire broad range of due process claims
in both civil and criminal cases, and cases arising under the Sixth and
Eighth Amendments. Therefore, this study draws its conclusion only
as to the three stated areas. There is, however, no apparent reason why
there should be a great difference in judicial performance in the ex-
cluded areas.
A sample size of at least one thousand total cases was originally
decided upon.114 A time frame of approximately seven years was cho-
sen to give a reasonably compact sample."1 5 In order to achieve a de-
gree of consistency in reporting, both among the several state courts
and between the federal and state courts, the West Reporting System
was used exclusively.' 1 6  Four hundred thirty-eight federal district
court cases were chosen from the Federal Supplement. Six hundred
eight were chosen from the various regional state court reporters.1 7
For federal cases, odd-numbered volumes from 393 to 511 were
chosen. Within each volume an average total of twelve cases in three
targeted subject areas was chosen at random and coded by the authors.
If a case raised multiple federal claims, only the first claim encountered
was used. Although the number of cases of each type differed from
volume to volume, on the average about half of the relevant reported
cases in each volume were sampled. For state cases, the method was the
same, except for the fact that a lower percentage of the reported cases
raised relevant federal constitutional claims. Therefore, in most in-
stances, the sampled cases constituted almost the entire population for
the sampled volumes.
For the purposes of this study, thirteen variables were coded." 8
114. A sample of this size can normally be relied on to give results accurate to within 3%
for percentages near 50%. See H. BLALOCK, supra note 95. Error margins for smaller sub-
samples are somewhat larger, but statistical measures are used that account for sample size.
115. We are not measuring historical change, and therefore tried to minimize the effects
of appointments, structural changes, legislative changes, and so forth. For a study that did
just the opposite by looking at state supreme courts over a one hundred year period, see
Kagan, Cartwright, Friedman & Wheeler, The Evolution of State Supreme Courts, 76 MIcH.
L. REv. 961 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Evolution of SSC].
116. Cases were chosen from the section in each reporter captioned "Statutes Con-
strued." Each case was checked to see if it was relevant to the subject matter of the study.
Some purely procedural cases that did not actually raise a constitutional issue were ex-
cluded, although they were listed in these sections.
117. The regional reporters are: Atlantic Second, Northeast Second, Northwestern Sec-
ond, Pacqfc Second, Southeastern Second, Southern Second, and Southwestern Second.
118. The variables coded were: (1) case name, (2) citation, (3) year decided, (4) state,
(5) court level (i.e., district, appellate, supreme), (6) state law (applicability of the 14th
Amendment) or federal law, (7) issue (amendment involved, subject matter), (8) type (crimi-
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The most important, of course, was the relevant outcome of the case,
that is, whether the federal constitutional claim was upheld or denied.
About 10% of the cases were double-coded. Several dozen were re-
corded when routine data checks pointed out inconsistencies or clerical
errors. We believe that the 1,046 cases represent a statistically valid
sample of the targeted cases for the years 1974 through 1980.119
The first step in the analysis of the entire sample is to establish a
norm, or benchmark, for success in constitutional claims.' 20 Table I
shows the overall results of all cases, federal and state, which raise the
aforementioned constitutional issues.
TABLE I
Results of All Cases
Claim Claim
Upheld Denied
36% 64%
(N=374) (N=672)
The 36% figure becomes the standard in our work, against which
we measure results of other subsamples (i.e., groups of cases that share
some factor in common).
The next step is to look at federal and state cases separately-that
is, at the two subsamples: constitutional claims in federal district courts
and constitutional claims in state appellate and supreme courts. Table
II shows the results of this step.
nal or civil), (9) outcome, (10) cases cited (number, by court level), (11) length of opinion,
(12) reversal or affirmance, and (13) dissents. For a study using a virtually identical method-
ology to code state court decisions, see M. Porter & G. Tarr, supra note 63.
119. The character of the sample of cases was compared to that in other studies (notably
Business of SSC, supra note 96), and found to be comparable as to regional differences, rates
of reversal, length of opinion, and citation practices. The authors are presently preparing a
more extensive evaluation of these factors for future presentation.
120. By "norm or benchmark" we mean simply a measure of what has taken place. This
in no way implies that there is a certain proportion of federal constitutional claims that
ought to be decided a certain way. There is even a temptation, which one must overcome, to
assume that each claim upheld is a victory for the Constitution, while each one denied is a
defeat. As Professor Bator has so eloquently pointed out, constitutional litigation is a pro-
cess of balancing a variety of constitutional principles and ideals. See Bator, supra note 26,
at 631-33. No matter what the outcome, if a claim is fully, fairly, and conscientiously liti-
gated, we are all winners.
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TABLE II
Results by Court System
Upheld Denied
Federal Court 41% 59%
(N=183) (N =255)
State Court 32% 68%
(N=191) (N=417)
Lambda = 0.000
In federal district court, 41% of all claims based on the federal
Constitution were upheld while 59% were denied. In state appellate
and supreme courts, 32% of the same claims were upheld, while 68% of
the claims were denied.
These percentages lend themselves to several common sense inter-
pretations. For example, one could say there is a nine percent greater
chance of success in federal court over the same range of issues. Or,
one could make the conjecture that if a litigant were to take the identi-
cal case to both a state and a federal court, nine times out of ten the
decision would be the same. We believe that whatever common sense
interpretation is chosen, there is support for the contention that there is
no clear reluctance on the part of state courts to uphold a federal claim
that would be upheld in federal district courts.12 1
But there are also several specific statistical measures that can be
used to interpret the relationship between forum and decision and that
can also help in analyzing other subsamples. One measure we can use
to see whether the data of the whole sample or any subsample is statis-
tically significant, is through the calculation of what is known as a Z
score. 122 In any array of data such as Table II, there is always the
possibility that the proportion arrived at occurred simply by chance.
121. One question that arises is whether, from the point of view of the plaintiff's attorney,
the 10% difference is, by itself, enough to encourage a preference for the federal forum. We
believe not. The reason for this belief is rooted in the nature of the aggregate data. An
attorney with no other information, who litigates over 1,000 cases over a seven year period
might well like the 10% "edge" he seems to have in federal court. But the attorney does have
other information about the facts of his cases and about his clients. He may also know of
trends of particular courts in deciding the issues that his clients' cases will present. It is on
this information that he must litigate, not on the aggregation of information from all other
similar cases.
122. For an explanation of the procedure using Z scores involving proportions, see H.
BLALOCK, supra note 95, at 197. For a study which uses this methodology, see Note, supra
note 102, at 1198. Although the approach used therein is similar to ours, we have been
unable to replicate some of its results.
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We say that the data is significant if there is less than a five percent
probability that such an array could be the result of pure chance."
The array in Table II is statistically significant because there is less
than a five percent chance that it could have occurred randomly.1 24
But statistical significance and relevance are not the same thing.125
In order to make claims about the relevance of the data, one needs to
know the strength of the relationship between outcome and forum. An
appropriate statistical measure must be chosen to determine this rela-
tionship. The measure we have chosen is Lambda. It is based on the
statistical method known as proportional reduction in error.'2 6 In plain
language, this measure answers the following question: How helpful in
predicting outcomes of cases is a knowledge of forum? If we can make
no better prediction about outcome by relying exclusively on a knowl-
edge of forum, we can say there is little relevance or importance to the
data. Conversely, if we could always correctly predict outcomes simply
from a knowledge of forum, there would be a "perfect" relationship
and obviously much relevance to the data. When Lambda is computed
for the data in Table II, it shows a very weak relationship between
forum and outcome. Therefore, we believe it is correct to characterize
the difference in outcomes as statistically significant (Le., not random),
but not important.
Even though the overall percentages are generally supportive of
parity, they by no means settle the issue. In the first place, parity does
not mean exact numerical equality. Parity means that there is no sys-
tematic bias on the part of state courts to deny federal claims (such
purported bias being based on environmental factors mentioned by
critics of parity). 27 In order to test for such bias, we must break down
the sample of cases and look at several categories in turn.
Table III sets out the relevant results for all cases when controlled
for case type. Of the total sample, about half were criminal cases and
half were civil cases.' 28
123. The .05 level is a customary significance level in social science research. See H.
BLALOCK, supra note 95, at 161.
124. The relevant Z score for this table is 3.62, which is significant at the .0002 level.
125. See H. BLALOCK, supra note 95, at 162 ("[S]tatistical significance does not necessar-
ily imply striking differences or ones that are important to the social scientists.").
126. The most important works in this area are by Goodman and Kruskal. See, e.g.,
their Measures of Association for Cross Classffcations, 49 AM. STATISTICAL ASS'N J. 732
(1954). For a general discussion of the concept see H. BLALOCK, supra note 95, at 307-11.
127. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
128. The Z score for civil cases is 1.48, which is significant at the .07 level. For criminal
cases it is 6.02, which is significant at the .37 level.
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TABLE 111129
Outcome Versus Forum by Case Type
Civil Cases Criminal Cases
Upheld Denied Upheld Denied
Federal Court 44.6% 55.4% 33.9% 66.1%
(N= 144) (N=179) (N=39) (N=76)
State Court 33.2% 66.8% 30.5% 69.5%
(N=67) (N=135) (N=124) (N=282)
Z = 1.48 Z = .602
This evidence is particularly useful because it goes directly to two
points raised by Professor Neuborne-that is, the espoused differences
in majoritarian electoral pressures on, and the psychological set of, fed-
eral vis-a-vis state judges. 3 1 Certainly a judge with one eye on the
public opinion polls would be well aware of the tremendous attention
that issues of crime and punishment garner with the voting public.'3 '
Furthermore, accused or convicted criminals are an easy target for a
judge who wants to "go into the tank" for the sake of public approval.
It is a great tribute to the independence of the American state judiciary
129. The Lambda obtained is .102, which is not very strong at all. However, a strong
caution is in order. Lambda was designed for use in 2 x 2 Tables. When controlling for a
given level of another variable (e.g., civil or criminal), another factor is added and this
changes the comparative value. For a true picture of the relationship, a more complicated
statistical model is necessary, using multivariate techniques.
In order to test for interaction effects among other explanatory variables in the sample,
we used the FUNCAT procedure of the Statistical Analysis System ["SAS"]. SAS is a com-
puter procedure copyrighted by the SAS Institute, Cary, North Carolina. This procedure
provides a logit (regression-like) equation. We used outcome as the response variable and
forum, amendment, and type (ie., criminal or civil case) as explanatory variables. The re-
suits of that analysis were as follows: (1) the response variable, outcome, is not influenced by
any interactions of the three explanatory variables (either the three-factor interaction or any
of the pairwise interactions); (2) the outcome variable is marginally (p = .071) affected by the
forum variable; (3) the outcome variable is significantly (p = .0001) affected by the amend-
ment variable (in particular, a significantly higher proportion of the 4th Amendment cases
are denied than are 1st Amendment cases); and (4) the type variable has no significant effect
on outcome (p = .36). For a more complete explanation of the statistical basis of FUNCAT,
see Grizzle, Starmer & Koch, Analysis of Categorized Data by Linear Models, 25 BioMET-
Rics 489 (1969).
130. See supra text at notes 67-68.
131. Survey data has consistently ranked crime as a very salient issue among the public.
See Sheley & Ashkins, Crime, Crime News, and Crime Views, 45 PuB. OPIN. Q. 492 (1981).
But f supra note 85 and accompanying text (suggesting a weak linkage between public
opinion and court functions).
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that such a parity exists between them and their allegedly more isolated
brethren on the federal bench.
The psychological set argument fares no better in the face of these
data. Allegedly, state judges are more hardened to constitutional
claims because they deal with more examples of the impact of crime
and criminals, yet our data show that they do not seem to be systemati-
cally acting on their psychological feelings by refusing to recognize
constitutional claims. Perhaps the notion of psychological set is over-
blown, or perhaps judges who are trained to be impartial are able to
overcome their personal feelings more easily than others not so trained
and socialized.
In order to obtain a clearer picture of the variance between federal
and state cases, Table IV sets out six categories of cases and the rele-
vant results for each.1 32
TABLE IV
Outcome Versus Forum for Various Subsamples
Civil Cases Criminal Cases
Upheld Denied Upheld Denied
1st Amendment
Federal Court 53.8% 46.2% 36.4% 63.6%
(N=92) (N=79) (N=4) (N=7)
State Court 40.3% 59.7% 51.2% 48.8%
(N=31) (N=46) (N=22) (N=21)
Z= -1.649 Z = .395
4th Amendment
Federal Court 42.9% 57.1% 33.3% 66.7%
(N=9) (N=12) (N=31) (N=62)
State Court 33.3% 66.7% 30.2% 69.8%
(N=I) (N=2) (N=92) (N=213)
Z = N/A, Low N Z = .54
132. Relevant Z scores are noted at the bottom of each table.
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Civil Cases Criminal Cases
Upheld Denied Upheld Denied
14th Amendment (Equal Protection)
Federal Court 32.8% 67.2% 36.4% 63.6%
(N=43) (N=88) (N=4) (N=7)
State Court 28.7% 71.3% 17.2% 82.8%
(N=35) (N=87) (N=1O) (N=48)
Z =-.521 Z= 1.30
Apparently, there is no pattern to these results. In two catego-
ries-Fourteenth Amendment civil cases and Fourth Amendment
criminal cases-there are no statistical differences between state and
federal courts. In one category-equal protection criminal cases-
there is a large percentage difference. In the Fourth Amendment civil
category, there is a difference, but it is close to the average for all
cases. 133 The proportion of claims upheld is relatively high for both
state and federal courts in the First Amendment civil category. And in
the First Amendment criminal category, the state average for uphold-
ing claims is actually somewhat higher than that of federal courts. We
believe that these data show no clear, across-the-board hostility on the
part of state courts to claims of federal constitutional rights, and that
they therefore support the premise enunciated in Supreme Court opin-
ions of the existence of relative parity between the state and federal
systems.
Since forum choice alone is clearly not a powerful explanation for
the statistical differences evidenced here, it is incumbent upon us to
speculate as to the reason for their existence. We will do this by posit-
ing an alternative model to support the existence of parity-one which
is based not exclusively on environmental components of alternative
forums, but rather on factors of informational flow and organizational
relationship. There is no need, for the purposes of this study, to explain
in detail the reasons for each of the differences. In order to add to the
"credibility" of the data, however, we can discuss each of the categories
and propose likely (but not "proven") 134 explanations.
Variances among First Amendment civil cases are the most diffi-
cult to interpret. Here both federal and state courts are likely to uphold
a higher percentage of claims than the overall average would indicate.
But the gap between federal and state courts is increased from 9.5% to
133. See supra Table II.
134. See supra note 129.
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13.5%. Notice, however, that the proportional rise in claims upheld is
very close indeed-27.6% to 31.0%. This indicates that there is some
"tracking" or concordance between the general treatment of First
Amendment civil cases by the courts.
First Amendment criminal cases pose a much different set of ques-
tions. In these cases there is a tendency for state courts to uphold
claims at a higher rate-51.2% versus 36.46%. Although obviously puz-
zling and damaging to the arguments of those who suspect a hostility
on the part of state courts to federal constitutional claims, a quite plau-
sible explanation is available. We may be witnessing an entirely sepa-
rate, yet important, parity problem-the parity between state and local
legislative bodies and the Congress of the United States.' 35 An over-
whelming proportion of state cases involved state and local criminal
laws. Federal legislative behavior-due to better staff work, the re-
sources of the Justice Department, the centrality of Washington, D.C.,
and the lesser number of federal criminal laws-may be more respon-
sive to constitutional limitations, raising the possibility that states are
more likely to pass laws which run afoul of the First Amendment. This
possibility would lead to a higher percentage of "worthy" claims in
state courts.
Although there are some interesting Fourth Amendment civil
cases in the data set, the sample sizes are too small to make any reason-
able assumptions. Fourth Amendment criminal cases are, we believe,
not only the strongest evidence for the existence of parity, but also in-
vite the most plausible explanation based on our preferred model of
constitutional decisionmaking. Although these cases would seem to be
the most likely to fit the pattern assumed by the skeptics of parity, 136 in
point of fact they present the closest parallel performance levels among
the categories. At work in these cases is an informal flow of informa-
tion between federal and state courts-mostly on the law of search and
seizure, but on other issues as well-which keeps both sets of courts on
very close parallel tracks. Judges, lawyers, prosecutors, and policemen
are all close to the "state of the art" in this area because of the obvious
and clearly defined penalties for failure to be so-that is, imposition of
the exclusionary rule. 13
7
The final two categories are civil and criminal equal protection
cases. In equal protection claims raised in criminal cases there is a very
135. See generally D. HERZBERG & A. ROSENTHAL, STRENGTHENING THE STATES: Es-
SAYS ON LEGISLATiVE REFORM (1972).
136. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 502 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
137. See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See also supra note 110.
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large difference between federal and state performance (over two-to-
one "in favor" of federal courts). We believe this shows the empirical
truth of an old chestnut: that the Equal Protection Clause, like patriot-
ism, is the last refuge of scoundrels. 138
In equal protection civil claims, there is clear statistical parity be-
tween state and federal courts. A total of 32.8% of the claims were
upheld in federal court while 28.7% were upheld in state court. This
correlation is supportive of parity because this type of case is arguably
central to the entire question of federalism. One of the consistent his-
torical arguments offered by the skeptics of parity is the alleged hostil-
ity of state courts to attempts by the federal government to enforce the
civil rights of minority groups, women, and others protected from dis-
criminatory state action by the federal Constitution. Yet in these data,
not only is there no discernible pattern of hostility, but there is perhaps
the closest statistical similarity of treatment among the categories
examined.
In summary, we see that comparing the outcome of federal consti-
tutional claims presents a complex model of judicial behavior, not the
uniform hostility that the doubters of parity would have us believe.
But the statistical evidence for the existence of parity is not the end of
the discussion; it is merely the beginning. Now that we can say that
there is scant evidence of a systematic hostility to federal constitutional
rights in state courts, we must ask: What are the consequences of this
conclusion?
III. Information Flow and Appellate Review:
The Significance of Parity
A. Information Flow and Litigant Influence: Impact on the
Performance of State Judges
In discussing the issue of parity, there is a tendency to concentrate
on the characteristics of individual judges. 139 Our own study uses the
products of these judges-written opinions-as its major data base.
138. Samuel Johnson gets credit for the quote on patriotism. See J. BOSWELL, THE LIFE
OF SAMUEL JOHNSON, L.L.D. 115 (MacMillan, 1908). Holmes applied it to equal protection
in a civil case. In denying an equal protection claim based on a state's practice of sterilizing
feeble-minded inmates of an asylum while not similarly treating nonconfined persons,
Holmes said: "It is the usual last resort of constitutional arguments to point out shortcom-
ings of this sort." Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
139. All of the major criticisms by Professor Neuborne go to this issue. See, e.g., supra
notes 66-68 and accompanying text. He includes training, psychological set, environment,
and electoral pressures in his causal model of state judicial inferiority. See Neuborne, supra
note 2, at 1121-28.
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But this concentration must be tempered by a recognition of the context
in which judicial decisions are made.
The judge is not a totally free actor, and the judicial system is not
self-executing. Before a judge can make a decision, a litigant must file
suit. Judges are bound by oath to follow the Constitution and by train-
ing and temperament to follow precedent. Not every case presents the
same sort of problems to the court. In the case of constitutional issues,
the range of situations presented to a judge is truly remarkable. In
some cases judges are merely asked to follow clear precedents, often
those created by the United States Supreme Court. In others they are
asked to chart new ground and begin a precedent-creating process-
literally to conceive of new constitutional rights."'S The skills of attor-
neys, particularly their relative abilities to deliver information, can pro-
foundly affect the outcome of the case, no matter what the judge is
being asked to do. Furthermore, our data have shown that the out-
come of cases involving federal constitutional issues does not depend
mainly on forum, and that the automatic preference for federal courts
evoked by the critics of parity, is short-sighted at best. Therefore, it is
incumbent upon us to consider other factors involved in the outcome.
Arguing that other actors besides the judge affect the decision-
making process in a court system, particularly at the trial level, is per-
haps to state the obvious. 141 However, virtually all of the literature on
parity appears to take the obvious for granted, and assumes that the
validity of parity rises (or falls) on the asserted quality of the individual
judge. Even conceding that the lower "quality" of state trial judges will
undermine parity (a concession we are unwilling to make),142 litigants'
140. See, eg., Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971)
(state court established right of equalization of school financing). See also cases cited in
Neuborne, supra note 52, at 725-26 n.2.
141. A number of studies have conceptualized courts as "organizations," particularly in
the criminal context, claiming the relationships between the judge, attorneys, and other
court personnel to be as important as the legal issue to be decided by the judge. See gener-
ally M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMI-
NAL COURT (1979); M. HEUMAN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS,
JUDGES AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS (1978); P. NARDULLI, THE COURTROOM ELITE: AN OR-
GANIZATIONAL PERSPECrIVE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1978); J. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, FEL-
ONY JUSTICE (1977); Mohr, Organizations, Decisions, and Courts, 10 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 621
(1976). The organization model, of which information flow is but one aspect, has perhaps
less relevance in the civil context.
The same analysis can, of course, be applied to federal courts. See Clark, Adjudication
to Administratiom .4 Statistical/Analysis of Federal District Courts in the Twentieth Century,
55 S. CAL. L. REv. 65, 67-68 (1981); Heydebrand, The Context of Public Bureaucracies: An
OrganizationalAnalysis ofFederal Distict Courts, 11 LAW & SoC'Y REv. 759 (1977).
142. See supra Part IIA.
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attorneys can provide a court with informational resources to overcome
institutional deficiencies. 143 A judge's lack of familiarity with federal
law could be corrected to some extent, for example, by the briefs filed
and the oral arguments delivered by attorneys. In short (to use termi-
nology derived from systems theory),'" the input of information can be
influenced by the litigants, while the conversion of the data may de-
pend almost entirely on the judge. The input function can be particu-
larly significant in making a judge aware of "social" or "legislative"
facts, 145 which at times assume importance in constitutional decisions
requiring the balancing of individual rights and state interests.
46
An adequate flow of important information is arguably helpful to
any trial judge. But the existence of parity, as we have defined it, does
not solve all problems within our judicial system. Information flow
itself may be skewed. One side may be in a better position to deliver its
version of the facts and law to a judge. Frequent litigants, or "repeat
players," have advantages in this regard over the infrequent litigant, or
"one shotter."' 7 Likewise, the organized bar, particularly in large cit-
143. See AMERICAN TRIAL JUDGES, supra note 72, at ch. IV.
The studies suggesting the importance of information flow to judges were developed in
connection with appellate courts, but we see no reason not to apply the model to trial judges
as well. See T. MARVELL, APPELLATE COURTS AND LAWYERS: INFORMATION GATHERING
IN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1978); Lamb, Judicial Policy-Making and Information Flow to
the Supreme Court, 29 VAND. L. REV. 45 (1976); Miller & Barron, The Supreme Court, The
Adversary System, and the Flow of Information to the Justices: .4 Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA.
L. REV. 1187 (1975).
144. The systems theory in political science, advanced by David Easton and other schol-
ars, postulates that the actors in any political system are affected by a great number of "in-
puts" in their decisionmaking, or "conversion" function. The "output" of this function will
affect the input in a feedback process. See D. EASTON, A FRAMEwORK FOR POLITICAL
ANALYSIS (1965). These concepts have been applied to the study of federal and state courts.
See H. GLICK & K. VINES, STATE COURT SYSTEMS ch. I (1973); S. GOLDMAN & T.
JAHNIGE, THE FEDERAL COURTS AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1976).
145. "Legislative" facts concerning broad issues of public policy, are to be distinguished
from the usual "adjudicative" facts, which concern only the immediate parties in litigation
before a court. See C. MCCORMICK, McCoRMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE,
766-69 (2d ed. 1972).
146. See T. MARVELL, supra note 143, chs. 10-13; Daynard, The Use of Social Policy in
Judicial Decision-Making, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 919 (1971).
147. The concepts are borrowed from Marc Galanter. See Galanter, Why the "Haves"
Come Out Ahead- Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 Lw & Soc'Y REV. 95
(1974). Galanter argues that repeat players are not only more likely to understand the
"rules" of litigation, but have the resources and incentive to shape the rules in their favor,
and hence are more likely to determine outcomes in cases. Id at 9S-103, 125. See also
Baum, Judicial Specialization, Litigant Influence, and Substantive Policy: The Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals, 11 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 823 (1977); Grossman, Kritzer, Bumiller,
Sarat, McDougal & Miller, Dimensions of Institutional Particoation: Who Uses the Courts,
andHow?, 44 J. POL. 86 (1982).
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ies, tends to be split into professional hemispheres, with some attorneys
practicing largely in federal courts and others confining their work to
state courts.148 The former undoubtedly would be more familiar with
federal law than the latter. What does it benefit a criminal defendant,
forced to press his constitutional claim in state court, to know that par-
ity exists, if all the information is "flowing" across the street in federal
court?
But if attorneys are willing to pursue federal cases in state courts,
the skewed system can be rectified. Cases presenting important federal
issues, which the critics of parity are particularly fearful of forcing into
state court, can still be litigated by those interest groups that pursue the
same cases in federal court.149 To prevent state judges from hearing
federal cases due to perceived institutional differences, it has been said,
creates a self-fulfilling prophecy: "[I]f state courts are widely scorned,
important matters are habitually removed from their jurisdiction and
incentives to exert political or social pressures to maintain or improve
their quality are removed from prospective litigants."150 Of course, to
the extent that one adopts the assumption that a substantial number of
state courts are not equal to the task of adjudicating, or are openly
hostile to, federally protected rights, the concern with this abandon-
ment of state court systems diminishes. I"' But since we believe that our
148. See J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE
BAR ch. I (1983); Galanter, supra note 147, at 114-19.
149. The use of "managed" litigation by interest groups was first noted by David Tru-
man, D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC
OPINION ch. XV (1951), and Clement Vose, Litigation as a Form of Pressure Group Activity,
319 ANNALS 20 (1958). See generally C. VosE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: AMENDMENT
POLITICS AND SUPREME COURT LITIGATION SINCE 1900 (1972). See also Brown, Book Re-
view, 24 EMORY L.J. 1937 (1975). While some argue that most cases brought to the Supreme
Court are the products of interest group activity, see, e.g., H. SPAETH, AN INTRODUCTION TO
SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING 26 (rev. ed. 1972); C. VOSE, supra, at 332, this is un-
doubtedly an overgeneralization. See Hakman, Lobbying the Supreme Court-An Appraisal
of "Political Science Folklore," 35 FORDHAM L. REv. 15 (1966). Nevertheless, the impor-
tance of interest groups in bringing test cases concerning federal constitutional rights re-
mains in a large number of cases. See O'Conner & Epstein, Amicus Curiae Particpation in
U.S. Supreme Court Litigation: An Appraisal of Hakman's "Folklore," 16 LAW & SoC'Y
REv. 311 (1982); K. O'Conner & L. Epstein, The Rise of Conservative Interest Group Liti-
gation (paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Pol. Sci. Ass'n, Milwaukee,
Wis., April, 1982).
In addition, interest groups often file amicus curiae briefs in courts, further augmenting
the information available to judges. See Krislov, TheAmicus Curiae Brief." From Friendshp
to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J. 694 (1963).
150. Developments, supra note 18, at 1284 (footnote omitted). See also Engle v. Isaac,
456 U.S. 107, 128-29 (1982); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519 (1982); Bator, supra note 26,
at 625; Neuborne, supra note 2, at 1129.
151. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 26, at 482-84.
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data demonstrate no such inequality or hostility, we are very concerned
with the self-fulfilling prophecy argument.
In summary, the fact that state courts may have been neglected in
the past in favor of federal forums does not necessarily chart the course
for the future. The Supreme Court seems ready to reverse this trend, 152
and this will certainly have serious implications for the future of state
judicial systems.
B. State Appellate Courts: Curing the Limitations of Trial Courts
As our empirical study indicates, we shifted the focus of attention
away from state trial courts exclusively, to the entire state judiciary,
including both intermediate appellate and supreme courts. Whatever
the limitations of state trial courts (which, we have attempted at great
length to suggest, are not extreme), every case raising a federal issue in
a trial court can be appealed to a higher court and, in theory, to the
United States Supreme Court. Hence, the issue of parity should be ex-
amined from the perspective of comparative court systems and not
from that of comparative trial judges.
The reviewing functions of state appellate and supreme courts
help to guarantee the continued validity of parity.'53 For state trial
judges, the prospect of review and the potential for reversal by the ap-
pellate court system, are incentives to respect federal constitutional
rights.'54 State appellate courts themselves are subject to review by
state supreme courts and by the United States Supreme Court. Any
systemic hostility to the enforcement of federal rights is unlikely to per-
sist under the threat of review by higher courts.
The state and federal appellate review system alone, as the
Supreme Court has suggested, can help to insure the continual exist-
ence of parity.15 5 And, the trust placed in this system is further rein-
forced by the latest data on state appellate courts. Some thirty-two
152. See supra Part 1B. For a recent example, see Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
153. See supra note 102.
154. See Landes & Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19
J.L. & EcoN. 249, 271-75 (1976); Shapiro, Appeal, 14 LAw & Soc'y REv. 629 (1980); Note,
supra note 102, at 1195. Professor Landes and Judge Posner argue that a judge will follow
precedent, including cases enforcing federal constitutional rights, due to the threat of appel-
late review and to the fact that other judges would disregard hit decisions if precedents were
ignored. See Landes & Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective,
18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975). The Landes and Posner model, we admit, is premised, to some
extent, on a legal climate where cases are many and precedents are clear. In fact, the oppo-
site may be true for many constitutional cases. See, e.g., Neuborne, supra note 2, at 1123.
155. See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 n.4 (1981); Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976); Bator, supra note 26, at 626-27.
Winter 1983] CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION: ANALYZING PARITY 251
states now have intermediate appellate courts,1 56 and, as we have al-
ready suggested, such courts are considered to have a benign effect on
state appellate review in general. This leads to a lower overall
caseload, with the consideration of more constitutional and "public
law" cases by state supreme courts.1 57 Such structural changes are said
to encourage "activism" by state supreme courts, and, we think, lead to
a heightened sensitivity to federal constitutional rights.' 58 Furthermore,
the model of information flow outlined above has been applied to a
study of decisions by state supreme courts. '59 The studies confirm, at
least in part, the validity of these assumptions, suggesting that state
courts are willing to go beyond the confines of the adversary system in
uncovering and relying upon "social and empirical information."' 160
This again, supports the ability of the state supreme courts adequately
to resolve complex constitutional questions.
The empirical data collected to date, including our own study,
bear out the validity of the reviewing functions of state courts. We
have already pointed out that past studies have shown little hostility (if
any) to the enforcement of federal rights by state supreme courts.' 61
Other studies have pointed out that state supreme courts have been
willing to overturn criminal convictions or declare statutes unconstitu-
tional at increasing rates. 162 Our study indicates that, in the past dec-
ade, state appellate courts as a whole have been upholding federal
constitutional rights at only slightly lower rates than federal district
courts. In short, the available empirical evidence confirms the sensitiv-
ity of state appellate courts to the enforcement of federal rights. Fi-
nally, the possibility of an ultimate review and reversal by the United
156. See Marvell & Kuykendall, supra note 101; Project, The Effect of Court Structure on
State Supreme Court Opinions: A Re-examination, 33 STAN. L. REV. 951, 952 n.2 (1981).
157. See Atkins & Glick, Environmental and Structural Variables as Determinants of Is-
sues in State Courts of Last Resort, 20 AM. J. POL. Sci. 97 (1976); Evolution of SSC, supra
note 115, at 999-1000. See also Citation by SSC, supra note 96.
158. Evolution of SSC, supra note 115, at 990-1000; Business of SSC, supra note 96, at
154; Project, supra note 156. These sources suggest that "activism" can be conceptualized
through a higher rate of upholding constitutional rights, as well as through more frequent
reversals, more frequent dissents, and longer opinions with more citations.
159. See T. MARVELL, supra note 143 (study from 1971 to 1975 of 112 written decisions
of six state supreme courts). Interestingly, Marvell concurrently studied 30 opinions from
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and found few differences
in the manner in which information was presented to federal court, or in the citation prac-
tices of federal court. Id at 134-35.
160. Marvell found that nearly one-half of the state court decisions cited "social facts,"
id at 153, with most of the facts supplied by the court's own search, id at chs. IX-XIII. See
also Citation by SSC, supra note 96.
161. See supra studies cited in notes 62 & 79.
162. See, e.g., Evolution ofSSC, supra note 115, at 994-98.
252 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 10:213
States Supreme Court stands as a guarantee that state court judgments
consistently hostile to existing federal rights will not be ignored. 16 3
Conclusion
Spurred by a revival of interest over determining the proper rules
for allocating the disposition of federal constitutional questions be-
tween federal and state forums, the debate over parity continues apace.
However, any consideration of empirical evidence has been noticeably
absent from this debate, with the exception of the voice of Professor
Neuborne. We examined the relevant empirical evidence from two
perspectives. First, we reviewed the institutional differences between
state and federal trial courts, and concluded that those disparities are
not extreme. Second, we outlined our own study comparing the adju-
dication of federal rights in state appellate courts and federal trial
courts. Based on our study, we concluded that there is simply no wide-
spread disregard for the vindication of federal rights in state appellate
courts. This conclusion considerably undermines the assumptions of
the skeptics of parity.
To defend, at least to a qualified extent, the existence of parity is
not inconsistent with contemporary notions of federalism. Recent judi-
cial decisions" and scholarly commentaries 65 indicate that the viabil-
ity of federalism remains a topic of legitimate concern in the legal
163. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text. The argument that ultimate review
of state court decisions by the United States Supreme Court is not a viable alternative rests
on grounds similar to those rejecting the comparison between state appellate courts and
federal trial courts. See supra note 69. For example, Professor Sager recently argued that
such a role by the Supreme Court is impossible to fulfill, since there is no "mechanical link"
between the Court and state judiciaries, and because state courts will control the factfinding
process, the timing of litigation, and the availability of interim injunctive relief. See Sager,
supra note 46, at 73-74. See also Redish, supra note 47, at 153-54. We do not find the first
three factors persuasive, for reasons developed at some length in this paper. As for the final
factor, Sager cites no evidence indicating that state courts, as a rule, will be unable to grant
litigants appropriate injunctive remedies. In any event, this factor is mitigated by
Neuborne's suggestion that federal "collateral rules," including those concerning remedies,
can and should apply in § 1983 actions litigated in state courts. See Neuborne, supra note
52, at 787.
164. See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (interpreting 10th
Amendment to the Constitution).
165. For studies generally sympathetic to the goals of federalism, see Kaden, Politics,
Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 847 (1979); Nagle,
Federalism as a Fundamental Value: National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 SuP. CT.
REv. 81; Guida & Solimine, Congressional Power and the Federal Srstem: 4 Constitutional
Analysis of the Proposed Energy Mobilization Board, 50 U. CIN. L. REN,. 1 (1981). See gener-
ally Scheiber, Federalism and Legal Process: Historical and Contemporary Analysis of the
American System, 14 LAw & Soc'y REv. 663 (1980).
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community. Even the harshest critics of those who claim parity exists
do not call for a complete abandonment of state participation in the
determination of federal cases. Ultimately, the Supreme Court seeks a
balance between state and federal interests,1 66 and accommodation of
both interests in the federal and state court systems.
The federal government has an interest in seeing that the Constitu-
tion is followed in state courts. The states have an interest in seeing
that their judicial procedures are taken seriously by all citizens and by
the federal courts. Our study of the empirical bases for parity indicates
that the Supreme Court decisions based on a premise of parity are not a
threat to federal constitutional rights. They are, however, a challenge
to maintain and enhance the quality of state judicial systems, without
which our federal system cannot operate.
166. See, e.g, M. REDISH, supra note 1, at 4.

